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Streszczenie
Syndrom poznawczo-uwagowy (CAS) to kluczowy konstrukt w metapoznawczym 
modelu psychopatologii i psychoterapii. Składają się na niego nieadaptacyjne wzorce 
powtarzającego się negatywnego myślenia i dysfunkcjonalne przekonania metapoznawcze. 
W tym podejściu teoretycznym jest on konstruktem transdiagnostycznym, leżącym u podłoża
różnego rodzaju zaburzeń psychicznych.
W poniższej pracy przedstawione zostały dwa artykuły naukowe. Głównym celem 
było potwierdzenie transdiagnostycznego statusu syndromu poznawczo-uwagowego. 
Pierwsza praca dotyczyła eksploracji związków nasilenia objawów CASu z objawami 
psychopatologicznymi i zaburzeniami psychicznymi. Druga objęła eksplorację różnic w 
funkcjonowaniu neuronalnym między osobami z wysokim i niskim nasileniem objawów 
CASu za pomocą indukcji ruminacji i pomiaru aktywności spoczynkowej mózgu podczas 
funkcjonalnego rezonansu magnetycznego.
Nasilenie objawów CASu jest powiązane z wyższym nasileniem różnych rodzajów 
objawów psychopatologicznych oraz jest związane z kilkukrotnie większym ryzykiem 
względnym rozpoznania zaburzeń psychicznych w obecnym momencie i w ciągu całego 
życia. Osoby z wysokim nasileniem objawów CASu różnią się także istotnie w zakresie 
połączeń funkcjonalnych w mózgu w kilku istotnych sieciach neuronalnych – sieci 
spoczynkowej, sieci wykonawczej i sieci istotności. 
Uzyskane wyniki mogą wskazywać na istotną rolę wysokiego nasilenia objawów 
CASu w etiopatogenezie różnego rodzaju zaburzeń psychicznych, co potwierdza jedno z 
głównych założeń metapoznawczej teorii zaburzeń psychicznych i rozszerza je o dodatkową 
perspektywę różnic w funkcjonowaniu mózgu u osób z różnym nasileniem objawów CASu.
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ruminacje, fMRI, resting state
Abstract
Cognitive-attentional syndrome is a key construct in the metacognitive approach to 
psychopathology and psychotherapy. It consists of maladaptive patterns of repetitive 
negative thinking and dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs. In this approach CAS is a 
transdiagnostic construct, involved in etiopathology of various psychological disorders.
Two scientific papers are presented in this dissertation. The main goal was to confirm 
the transdiagnostic status of cognitive-attentional syndrome. The first one concentrated on 
exploring the relationship between CAS and psychopathology symptoms and psychological 
disorders. The other one was concerned with the differences in neural functioning between 
people with high and low levels of CAS symptoms. This was done by means of rumination 
induction procedure and a resting state fMRI session. 
CAS symptoms are related to higher levels of various psychopathology symptoms 
and several times higher relative risk of diagnosing both current and lifetime psychological 
disorders. People reporting high levels of CAS also differ significantly in the brain functional
connectivity in some prominent brain neural networks – default mode, central executive and 
salience networks. 
Results of this study indicate a prominent role that high levels of CAS symptoms may
have in etiopathogenesis of various psychological disorders. This confirms one of the main 
assumptions of metacognitive theory of psychopathology. Plus to that, it provides an 
additional perspective of the differences in brain functioning between people reporting high 
and low levels of CAS symptoms.
Keywords: metacognitive therapy, metacognitive beliefs, depression, anxiety, PTSD, 
rumination, fMRI, resting state
Wprowadzenie
Niniejsza praca  dotyczy syndromu-poznawczo uwagowego (cognitive-attentional 
syndrome, CAS), jego neuronalnych korelatów oraz związków z objawami 
psychopatologicznymi. Składają się na nią dwa artykuły opublikowane w anglojęzycznych 
recenzowanych czasopismach naukowych (pierwszy w Comprehensive Psychiatry, a drugi 
we Frontiers in Psychology, w numerze specjalnym poświęconym terapii w nurcie 
metapoznawczym – Metacognitive Therapy: Science and Practice of a Paradigm). Pierwsza 
praca obejmuje dwa badania korelacyjne na dużych próbach (n=1225 i 602) i badanie z 
udziałem n=98 osób z zastosowaniem strukturyzowanego wywiadu klinicznego. Druga praca
to badanie z zastosowaniem funkcjonalnego rezonansu magnetycznego (fMRI), w kórym 
zastosowano dwie procedury badawcze – indukcję myślenia ruminacyjnego i pomiar 
aktywności spoczynkowej mózgu (rsfMRI), z udziałem n=55 osób. Ze względu na 
obszerność prezentowanego materiału zdecydowano się przedstawić te dwie prace jako cykl.
Podstawowym konstruktem teoretycznym, do którego odwołują się obie prace, jest 
syndrom poznawczo-uwagowy. Według metapoznawczego podejścia do zaburzeń 
psychicznych, opracowanego przez Adriana Wellsa (2009) i modelu samoregulującej funkcji 
wykonawczej autorstwa Wellsa i Matthewsa (1994, 1996), CAS jest zbiorem stylów czy 
strategii myślenia i zachowania, które wynikają z nieadaptacyjnych przekonań 
metapoznawczych. Te style myślenia obejmują wzorzec powtarzających się negatywnych 
myśli, dotyczących przeszłości i przyszłości – ruminacji i zamartwiania się – oraz 
koncentracji uwagi na zagrażających bodźcach – myślach, doznaniach cielesnych, sygnałach 
ze środowiska. Strategie behawioralne obejmują takie niekorzystne zachowania jak tłumienie
myśli i emocji, próby kontrolowania myśli i doznań cielesnych, unikanie sytuacji, 
spożywanie alkoholu i sięganie po substancje psychoaktywne, proszenie innych o 
zapewnienia. Nieadaptacyjne przekonania metapoznawcze dzielą się na dwie kategorie: 
pozytywne i negatywne Przekonania pozytywne dotyczą oczekiwanych korzyści i zysków ze
strategii związanych z objawami CASu, np. "Dzięki ruminowaniu zrozumiem dlaczego taki 
jestem", "Zamartwianie się pozwala mi być przygotowanym na najgorsze", "Jeśli będę 
kontrolował swoje myśli o tym jak mi źle, to poczuję się lepiej". Tymczasem, przekonania 
negatywne dotyczą przede wszystkim braku kontroli nad myślami i spodziewanych w 
związku z tym zagrożeń, np. „Nie jestem w stanie pracować, kiedy cały czas się 
zamartwiam”, „Jeśli nie mam kontroli nad myślami, to znaczy, że jestem nieprzewidywalny”,
„Rozchoruję się jeśli będę cały czas myślał w ten sposób”. 
Tematyka syndromu-poznawczo uwagowego została podjęta z kilku powodów. 
Pierwszym jest rosnąca popularność podejść do psychopatologii i psychoterapii w nurcie 
metapoznawczym (Moritz i Lysaker, 2018, Moritz, Lysaker, Hofmann i Hautzinger, 2018), a 
szczególnie obiecujące wydają się być wyniki badań dotyczące skuteczności terapii 
metapoznawczej stworzonej przez Adriana Wellsa (Normann i Morina, 2018). Niezwykle 
ważnymi elementami rozwoju podejścia do terapii jest weryfikacja założeń teoretycznych 
danego modelu oraz  jakości i użyteczności narzędzi pomiarowych używanych w badaniach 
nad tym podejściem. Prezentowane tutaj artykuły dotyczą tej problematyki. Taką kwestią 
może być namysł nad stosowanymi dotąd sposobami pomiaru nasilenia objawów CASu i 
trafność różnego rodzaju pomiarów. Kluczowym zaś aspektem eksplorowanym i 
dyskutowanym w przedstawionych tu pracach jest transdiagnostyczny status CASu, który 
wedle teorii Wellsa (2009) leży u podłoża zaburzeń, przede wszystkim emocjonalnych: 
depresyjnych i lękowych oraz zaburzenia po stresie traumatycznym (post-traumatic stress 
disorder, PTSD), ale także na przykład zaburzeń obsesyjno-kompulsyjnych. Prezentowane w
tej pracy badania dotykają tej problematyki poprzez eksplorację związków nasilenia CASu z 
objawami psychopatologicznymi i ustalenie diagnoz klinicznych u osób z wysokim i niskim 
nasileniem objawów CASu oraz badanie neuronalnych korelatów tego syndromu. Określenie
charakterystyki syndromu przez badanie jego mózgowego podłoża zazębia się z 
nowoczesnymi, wielowymiarowymi podejściami do psychopatologii, w których poza 
obrazem klinicznym analizuje się również dane biologiczne czy neurofizjologiczne, łącząc je
we wspólną konceptualizację. Przykładem takiego podejścia może być zapowiedziany i 
realizowany przez National Insitute of Mental Health z USA projekt Research Domain 
Criteria (RDoC) (Cuthbert, 2014), w którym deficyty i zaburzenia w kluczowych obszarach 
funkcjonowania (np. procesy poznawcze, jak uwaga, czy systemy społeczne jak formowanie 
więzi i przywiązania) mają być konceptualizowane na różnych poziomach, od korelatów 
genetycznych, poprzez komórki, sieci neuronowe, reakcje fizjologiczne i zachowanie aż po  
obserwacje pochodzące z samoopisu.
Pierwsza prezentowana tutaj praca, obejmująca łącznie aż trzy badania, miała na celu 
ukazać właściwości psychometryczne kwestionariusza CAS-1, służącego do pomiaru 
nasilenia objawów CASu, jego struktury czynnikowej oraz, przede wszystkim, związków z 
objawami psychopatologicznymi. Miała również odpowiedzieć na pytanie dotyczące 
sposobów pomiaru CASu, jako że w literaturze obecne są dwa sposoby – łączenie miar 
ruminacji/zamartwiania się i przekonań metapoznawczych lub stosowanie samodzielnie 
kwestionariusza CAS-1. Właściwości narzędzia okazały się ogólnie zadowalające. 
Wykazano, że łączenie różnych narzędzi do pomiaru CASu pozwala na lepszą predykcję 
nasilenia objawów psychopatologicznych niż sam kwestionariusz CAS-1. W celu eksploracji
związków z zaburzeniami psychicznymi przeprowadzono badanie korelacyjne na dużej 
próbie (N=602), gdzie wykorzystano kwestionariusze objawów psychopatologicznych i 
jakości życia, oraz badanie na próbie niemal 100 osób z zastosowaniem wywiadu 
standaryzowanego SCID-I. Badanie korelacyjne wykazało umiarkowanie silne pozytywne 
związki między nasileniem objawów CASu i wszystkimi rodzajami mierzonych objawów 
psychopatologicznych. Wyniki te są zgodne z wcześniejszymi pracami, głównie dotyczącymi
objawów i zaburzeń depresyjnych i lękowych (np. Fergus i wsp. 2012, 2013) oraz zaburzeń 
snu (Fergus i Scullin, 2017) oraz wskazały na związki między nasileniem objawów CASu i 
innymi rodzajami objawów psychopatologicznych, np. objawami wytwórczymi, uzależnień, 
manii, zaburzeń jedzenia, funkcji poznawczych czy seksualnych. Doprowadziły też autorów 
do dyskutowanych w tej pracy hipotez, których mogą dotyczyć przyszłe badania, np. CASu 
jako moderatora między czynnikami ryzyka albo mechanizmami psychopatologii a 
wystąpieniem lub nasileniem objawów. Przeprowadzone badania potwierdzają zdecydowane 
związki CASu z niemal każdym mierzonym nasileniem objawów w populacji ogólnej. Może 
to wskazywać na rolę CASu w formowaniu zaburzeń, gdzie interakcja czynników ryzyka i 
poziomu CASu jest w zależności moderacji – im wyższy poziom CASu, tym silniejsza 
zależność między wystąpieniem czynnikiem ryzyka psychopatologii a diagnozą zaburzenia. 
W innej pracy, nie ujętej w tym cyklu, analizowane są związki między poziomem CASu, 
obecnością diagnozy klinicznej i historią traumatycznych doświadczeń w dzieciństwie 
(Dragan i Kowalski, w recenzji). Wyniki tego badania zdają się potwierdzać tę relację – 
wysoki poziom CASu i obecność traum w wieku dziecięcym są silnie związane z obecnością
diagnozy zaburzeń emocjonalnych (87% badanych z tej kategorii), zaś osoby z niskim 
poziomem CASu i doświadczeniem traum były nawet rzadziej diagnozowane niż osoby bez 
takiego doświadczenia i wysokim poziomem CASu (19% versus 31%), co może wskazywać 
na istotną rolę CASu w rozwoju zaburzeń albo obecność innych, niebadanych czynników 
ryzyka.
 Ostatnie badanie z pierwszego prezentowanego w tej pracy artykułu - badanie z 
zastosowaniem wywiadu klinicznego, polegające na określeniu diagnoz psychiatrycznych w 
grupie osób z niskim i wysokim nasileniem objawów CASu, wykazało, że w tej drugiej 
grupie od kilku do kilkunastu razy częściej mogą być diagnozowane zaburzenia psychiczne. 
Ryzyko względne wyniosło RR=6.34 (CI 95%=2.91–13.80) dla diagnozy w ciągu życia i 
RR= 7.36 (CI 95%= 2.32–23.39) dla obecnej diagnozy. Rozpoznawane były przede 
wszystkim zaburzenia depresyjne i lękowe oraz zaburzenie po stresie traumatycznym, ale 
również zaburzenia związane z nadużywaniem substancji i zaburzenia odżywiania.
Jak wykazano w części przeglądowej w drugiej z prac składających się na 
przedstawiony cykl publikacji, zaburzenia emocjonalne, tj. depresyjne i lękowe, oraz PTSD 
wiążą się ze zmienionymi wzorcami funkcjonowania mózgu w obszarach związanych z 
emocjami (emotion processing), myśleniem na własny temat (self-referential processing) i 
celowym funkcjonowaniem poznawczym (task-oriented processing) (meta-analizy: 
Hamilton i wsp., 2012; Palmer, Crewther, Carey i wsp., 2015; Ipser, Singh i Stein, 2013; 
Simmons & Matthews, 2012). W związku z tym, że - jak wykazano we wcześniejszej pracy -
wysokie nasilenie objawów CASu powiązane jest z kilku- do kilkunastokrotnie 
zwiększonym ryzykiem względnym rozpoznania zaburzeń psychicznych, postanowiono 
eksplorować neuronalne korelaty tego syndromu w obszarach mózgu szczególnie 
związanych z ruminacyjnym stylem myślenia, istotnym elementem CASu, oraz wskazanych 
w wymienionych wcześniej meta-analizach jako obszary zmienionego funkcjonowania 
mózgu u osób z zaburzeniami psychicznymi. Przeprowadzono badanie osób wybranych z 
dużej próby (N=1225) ze względu na niski (n=33) bądź wysoki (n=25) i stały w czasie 
poziom nasilenia objawów CASu. Zastosowano dwie metody badania fMRI – zadanie z 
indukcją myślenia ruminacyjnego (zmodyfikowana procedura badania z udziałem osób z 
depresją – Cooney i wsp., 2010) oraz pomiar aktywności spoczynkowej mózgu (resting 
state). Procedura indukcji ruminacji obejmowała jako warunek kontrolny również zadanie z 
myśleniem abstrakcyjnym, w którego przetwarzaniu mózgowym również odkryto różnice 
między grupami, co stanowi znaczące rozszerzenie danych dotyczących wykorzystanej 
procedury, w którym różnice w zakresie myślenia abstrakcyjnego u osób z depresją nie były 
w ogóle analizowane i raportowane (Cooney i wsp., 2010). Wyniki analizy połączeń 
funkcjonalnych (functional connectivity) w tych dwóch procedurach badawczych wykazały 
zmienione wzorce połączeń funkcjonalnych w obszarach związanych z przetwarzaniem 
emocji, myśleniem i przetwarzaniem informacji na własny temat oraz przetwarzaniem 
związanym z zadaniami. Obszary te przynależą do głównych sieci funkcjonalnych 
identyfikowanych w ludzkim mózgu – sieci spoczynkowej (default mode network), 
centralnej sieci wykonawczej (central executive network) i sieci istotności (salience 
network). 
Podsumowując, pierwszy artykuł obejmuje trzy badania, dwa korelacyjne na dużych 
próbach i jedno porównawcze z przeprowadzeniem diagnozy klinicznej, drugi zaś obejmuje 
badanie fMRI z zastosowaniem dwóch procedur – indukcji ruminacji i myślenia 
abstrakcyjnego i pomiaru aktywności spoczynkowej mózgu. Pierwszy artykuł wskazuje na 
szerokie i stosunkowo silne związki nasilenia objawów CASu z różnego rodzaju objawami 
psychopatologicznymi, jak równieżna wielokrotnie zwiększone ryzyko względne 
rozpoznania zaburzeń psychicznych u osób z wysokim poziomem objawów CASu w 
porównaniu do osób z ich niskim poziomem. Z kolei badanie z zastosowaniem fMRI 
wskazuje na różnice w funkcjonowaniu mózgu między osobami z wysokim i niskim 
nasileniem objawów CASu – zarówno w zakresie podstawowych sieci neuronalnych i 
przetwarzania emocji czy informacji o sobie, jak również  przetwarzania związanego z 
zadaniami. Wyniki przedstawionych w tych pracach badań stanowią argument za 
metapoznawczym modelem zaburzeń psychicznych, w których wysoki poziom objawów 
CASu jest czynnikiem leżącym u podłoża różnego rodzaju zaburzeń emocjonalnych.
Zaprezentowane w tej pracy badania mają swoje ograniczenia. Są to badania 
korelacyjne i głównie porównawcze, które nie pozwalają na wyciąganie wniosków o 
charakterze przyczynowo-skutkowym, jeśli chodzi o rolę CASu w etiopatogenezie zaburzeń 
psychicznych. Jednocześnie stanowią uzupełnienie luk w istniejącej literaturze przedmiotu 
dotyczącej metapoznawczego podejścia do psychopatologii. Według wiedzy autora 
zaprezentowano tutaj pierwsze badanie, w którym formalnie diagnozowano osoby z różnym 
nasileniem objawów CASu oraz pierwsze badanie mózgowych korelatów CASu. Stanowią 
one znaczący wkład w potwierdzenie transdiagnostycznego statusu CASu – powtarzającego 
się negatywnego myślenia i nieadaptacyjnych przekonań metapoznawczych – jako czynnika 
ryzyka rozwoju zaburzeń psychicznych różnego rodzaju, szczególnie zaburzeń depresyjnych 
i lękowych. Wykrycie różnic w mózgowej aktywności  u osób z wysokim i niskim 
nasileniem CASu, które obejmują różnego rodzaju sieci funkcjonalne, jest zgodne z 
założeniami metapoznawczego modelu psychopatologii i stanowi jego rozwinięcie. 
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anxiety1. Introduction
Cognitive-attentional syndrome (CAS) is a core aspect of Wells'
metacognitive approach to psychopathology and the metacognitive
therapy (MCT) of emotional disorders [1–3]. It consists of three aspects:
1) repetitive negative thinking, i.e. rumination and worry; 2) focusing
attention on threats (external – e.g. a person with social anxiety disor-
der paying attention to any display of vexation amongst peers, or inter-
nal – e.g. a personwith panic disorder scanning their bodily functions in
search of threatening signals like elevated heart rate); and 3) maladap-
tive, paradoxically inefficient behaviors and strategies used to copewith
the first two aspects (e.g. thought suppression, thought and situation
avoidance, or substance/alcohol use). These thinking and behavior pat-
terns have been observed and interpreted as the cause of psychological
problems in a plethora of clinical and population-based studies
[e.g. 3–8]. CAS results from maladaptive positive (‘worrying helps
me cope’) and negative (‘worrying will ruin my health’) metacognitive; CAS-1, Cognitive-Attentional
py; MCQ-30, Metacognitions
rsity of Warsaw, ul. Stawki 5/7,
. Kowalski).
icle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (beliefs and corresponding schemas and meta-strategies, which are re-
versibly solidified by elevated levels of CAS [2,9–14]. Thus
metacognitive beliefs are also central to CAS. This syndrome has a
central role in the self-regulatory executive function model (S-REF)
developed by Wells & Matthews [1,4]. According to this model, self-
regulatory executive function becomes activated when there is a
discrepancy between self-relevant goals (outer circumstances and
mental states) and perceived goals. In most people, periods of CAS acti-
vation – and therefore negative emotions, self-appraisal, and sense of
threat – will be brief or non-existent. However, some will experience
prolonged CAS activation, which is understood in the S-REF model as
the cause of emotional and other psychiatric disorders or their core,
common component. Therefore, CAS is seen as a basic and
transdiagnostic factor of psychological disturbances, especially emo-
tional disorders (e.g. mood and anxiety disorders), but it is also possible
that other types of psychiatric symptoms are intensified by elevated
levels of CAS. Prolonged CAS activation may result from its vicious-
circle characteristic: for example, a person with income- and poverty-
related anxiety after losing their job engages in negative repetitive
thoughts on the causes (rumination) and consequences (worry) of the
event, resulting from positive metacognitive beliefs (e.g. ‘this thinking
will help me understand and prepare’). Consequently, this person may
experience loss of performance due to their attention resources being
engaged by CAS or simply find that they are devoting excessivehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
14 J. Kowalski, M. Dragan / Comprehensive Psychiatry 91 (2019) 13–21amounts of time toworry and rumination. This observationmay trigger
worrying about worrying [cf. 3] due to negative metacognitive beliefs
(e.g. ‘I won't be able to work if I constantly worry’). Strategies like
attempting to suppress thoughts about having lost a job or avoiding
job-related topics will probably lead to greater preoccupation with
these thoughts, meaning that CAS is likely to continue to occur.
The Cognitive-attentional Syndrome Questionnaire (CAS-1) was de-
veloped to measure aspects of CAS, with its primary goal being use in
clinical practice [2] (note: cognitive-attentional syndrome – the theo-
retical construct – is abbreviated as CAS and the questionnaire which
measures it was named the CAS-1 by Wells [2]; these abbreviations
are used in this paper). It was devised as a short tool for assessing gen-
eral levels of CAS without disorder-specific symptomatology. To date,
there have been three studies which have used the CAS-1 [15–17].
The first study [15]was conducted on a student sample and revealed re-
lationships between CAS and anxiety, depression, and stress as well as
the moderating role of beliefs about attentional control in these
relationships – beliefs about low attention control produced stronger
relationships between elevated CAS and psychopathology symptoms.
The second study [16]was conducted on a sample of patientswith emo-
tional disorders (primarily mood or anxiety disorders). It revealed rela-
tionships between CAS and depressive and anxiety symptoms aswell as
the incremental validity of the CAS-1when controlling for psychological
inflexibility. The third study [17] established a relationship between
CAS, especially maladaptive strategies and negative metacognitive be-
liefs, and sleep disturbances.
It seems important for the diagnostic use of the CAS-1 to detail its
psychometric properties in a large community sample and to analyze
gender and age differences. It is hypothesized that female participants
will have higher levels of CAS as they are more often afflicted with de-
pressive [18] and anxiety [19] disorders. Emotional disorders are a pri-
mary interest in metacognitive models, however the psychological
mechanisms they describe might not be universal across other disor-
ders. For example, men are more often affected by substance/alcohol-
abuse disorders [20]. It is assumed that such disorders might be related
to a slightly different set of metacognitive beliefs [21,22], mostly
concerning the role of alcohol/substances in emotional regulation. A
large epidemiological study in a Polish sample [23] revealed similar gen-
der differences in emotional disorders and substance/alcohol-related
disturbances. In light of mixed results concerning the differing preva-
lence of disorders in different age groups in the Polish population [23],
it is hypothesized that the null-hypothesis of no differences in CAS
levels between age groups will hold. The predictive value of the CAS-1
is also important for validating the transdiagnostic status of CAS [cf.
16]. The theoretical model proposed byWells and Matthews [2,24] im-
plies that people with high and/or frequent CAS activation are prone to
developing emotional disorders.We aim to test this implication of S-REF
theory. The aforementioned studies, and others [10–12], work back-
wards because they explore CAS (mostly as a combination of
metacognitive beliefs, rumination tendencies, or worrying) in patients
with established diagnoses, especially depression and generalized anx-
iety disorder (GAD). A second group of studies explore levels of symp-
toms, but without full clinical examination [9,12,13]. To date, there
have been no studies exploring various psychiatric disorders in people
with high CAS levels. As mentioned above, most studies validating
metacognitive models of disorders did not use the CAS-1, instead they
mostly used a combination of the metacognitions questionnaire
(MCQ-30) [25] and rumination or worry questionnaires for depression
and anxiety models, respectively. Thus, it is of interest to measure the
validity of the CAS-1 in predicting the symptoms of various psycholog-
ical disorderswhen controlling for the results ofmetacognition, rumina-
tion, or worrying questionnaires [26]. The hypothesis here is that the
CAS-1 could serve as a stand-alone measure of all elements of CAS,
predicting a high percentage of the variance of general psychopathology
and emotional disorder symptoms. Because different methods of
assessing CAS were used in previous studies [9–13,15–17], testing thishypothesis will allow the issue of various measures of CAS being used
in research to be addressed. Examining the factorial structure of the
CAS-1 is also of interest [16]. The CAS-1, as a comprehensible measure
of CAS, should consist of four factors (worry/rumination, attention to
threat, CAS-related behaviors, and metacognitive beliefs) which will
load one main factor – CAS, according to Wells's metacognitive theory
[2]. Repetitive negative thinking (i.e. worry/rumination) and attention
to threatmay be viewed as functioning strategies [24], asmay the strat-
egies and behaviors listed separately in the CAS-1, thus it is important to
test a model in which these items are grouped together in such a fash-
ion. Also, metacognitive beliefs are conceptually divided into positive
and negative beliefs, which should also be reflected in factor analyses.
Thus, in the present paper we examine 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5- factor models
of the CAS-1 and compare them against each other.
Three studies are presented in this paper. The first study deals with
the convergent validity of the CAS-1 and age and sex differences in
cognitive-attentional syndrome levels in a large sample mirroring the
population of a large city. The factorial structure of the CAS-1 is also ex-
plored in this study. The second study concerns the convergent validity
of the CAS-1, its relationships with different types of psychopathology
symptoms and quality of life, aswell as the validity of this questionnaire
in predicting levels of psychopathology symptoms, taking into account
the rumination and metacognitive beliefs questionnaires. The third
study, conducted on a pre-selected sample of people with high and
low CAS scores, concerns the predictive validity of CAS as a theoretical
construct through ascertaining clinical diagnoses in both groups.
2. Study 1
2.1. Procedure and sample characteristics
The study was conducted through an internet survey panel. The
panel participants are offered financial and/or material rewards for par-
ticipation in different survey studies. In this study, the participants were
additionally motivated by the possibility of a large financial reward
(about 50 EUR) for participation in the second stage of the study.
The sample was gathered for the purpose of a further fMRI study, so
therewere strict exclusion criteria: a history of head trauma andpsychi-
atric and neurological disorders, substance dependence, metal objects
within the body, being pregnant, having irremovable piercings, tattoos
on the head area, left-handedness, claustrophobia, serious medical pro-
cedures in the past two years, and sundry medical equipment such as
artificial pacemakers, bypasses, stents, etc. Participants were also re-
quired to live inWarsawand the surrounding area to ensure their ability
to participate in further stages of the study. Fig. 1 shows a consort flow-
chart of the recruitment of participants.
A total of 1225 participants were eligible and completed the study.
The dropout rate was 36%. Participants were selected based on quotas
mirroring the population ofWarsaw [27,28] in terms of sex, age, and ed-
ucation. However, the final demographic structure of the obtained sam-
ple was slightly different to Warsaw's population: 52% females in the
population vs 61% in the study sample; 27% people aged 18–29, 42%
aged 30–39, and 31% aged 40–50 in the population vs 38%, 39%, and
23% respectively in the study sample; the demographic was also shifted
in favor of higher education, with 53% of the population having higher
education vs 64% in the study sample. The characteristics of the final
sample are presented in the results section.
2.2. Method and measures
2.2.1. The Cognitive-Attentional Syndrome Questionnaire (CAS-1)
The CAS-1 [2] questionnaire consists of 16 items. The first two,
assessed on a scale from 0 to 8, are questions concerning the frequency
of rumination and worry as well as concentration on threats. A further
six items, assessed on a scale from 0 to 8, concern maladaptive behav-
iors used to cope with negative emotions and/or thoughts, e.g. thought
Fig. 1. Consort flow chart for recruitment for the first study.
Table 1
Details of linear regression analysis with CAS-1 as response variable and with
demographic and questionnaire measures as predictors.
Response variable: CAS-1 β t p
Age 0.05 2.22 0.027
Gender −0.04 −1.94 0.053
RRS subscales Brooding 0.22 7.53 b0.001
Reflection 0.17 5.39 b0.001
MCQ-30 subscales Cognitive Confidence −0.04 −1.47 0.14
Positive Beliefs 0.16 6.41 b0.001
Cognitive Self-consciousness 0.02 0.63 0.53
Uncontrollability and Danger 0.23 7.78 b0.001
Need to Control Thoughts 0.13 4.30 b0.001
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control thoughts or emotions. The last eight items, assessed on a scale
from 0 to 100, concern positive and negative metacognitive beliefs
core to cognitive-attentional syndrome: e.g. “worrying too much could
harmme” or “worrying helpsme cope”. The results of the questionnaire
were calculated as in the paper by Fergus et al. [15] – the last eight items
were recalculated to range between 0 and 8 before being summed up.
The total results can range from0 to 128,where a higher result indicates
a greater level of cognitive-attentional syndrome. The Polish version
was prepared in cooperation with the author of the original scale and
translated into Polish with the use of the back-translation procedure.
2.2.2. Ruminative Response Scale (RRS)
The 22-item Ruminative Response Scale was originally extracted
from the 71-item Response Styles Questionnaire [29]. It focuses on
one's responses to depressive mood: concentration on the self, symp-
toms, and the causes and consequences of depressive mood. A newer
approach excludes from the scale itemswhich are too highly correlated
with depression measures and distinguishes two subscales: a
“Reflection” subscale, which captures the contemplative and problem-
solving nature of self-focused thinking, and a “Brooding” subscale,
which is defined as moody and gloomy pondering [30]. The “Brooding”
and “Reflection” subscales both consist of 5 items, with results ranging
from 4 to 20, where a higher result indicates higher levels of a particular
response to depressedmood. The Polish version of the RRS (revised) has
generally good psychometric qualities [31]. In the current study, the RRS
had excellent internal consistency of α = 0.94 and the subscales
had acceptable internal consistency: Brooding α= 0.83 and Reflection
α= 0.76.
2.2.3. Metacognitions Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30)
The short version of the Metacognitions Questionnaire, developed
by Wells and Cartwright-Hatton [25], consists of five subscales and 30
items. It concerns metacognitive beliefs: monitoring techniques, judg-
ments, and beliefs about one's thoughts and cognitive abilities essential
in the metacognitive model of psychopathology. The “Cognitive Confi-
dence” subscale concerns one's beliefs about insufficient cognitive abil-
ities, e.g. “I have a poormemory”. The “Positive Beliefs” subscale consists
of items about the advantageous qualities ofworry, e.g. “Worrying helps
me cope”. The “Cognitive Self-consciousness” subscale concerns one's
tendency tomonitor cognition, e.g. “I constantly examinemy thoughts”.
The fourth subscale, “Uncontrollability and Danger”, explores thenegative aspects ofworry, e.g. “I couldmakemyself sickwithworrying”.
The final subscale is about the “Need to Control Thoughts”, e.g. “I should
be in control of my thoughts all the time”. The Polish version of this
questionnaire exhibits good psychometric qualities and is considered
equivalent to the English version [32]. In this study, the MCQ-30 had
an excellent internal consistency of α= 0.91 and its subscales had ac-
ceptable internal consistency, with α values ranging from 0.76 to 0.88.
2.2.4. Method
This study was designed as a correlative study and was based on a
large sample mirroring the population of a big city. The validity of the
CAS-1was testedwith a linear regressionmodelwith demographic var-
iables as well as RRS and MCQ-30 scores as predictors. A univariate
ANOVA with two-way interaction was performed to examine age and
gender differences in CAS-1 scores. These statistics were calculated
with SPSS 24 software. Effect sizeswere calculatedwith an online calcu-
lator (https://www.psychometrica.de/effect_size.html), accounting for
group size differences. The factor structure of the CAS-1 was analysed
with confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 24 software with compara-
tive fit index (CFI) and root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) used as fit indices. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
[33] was used to compare structural models against each other.
2.3. Results of study 1
The CAS-1 had an internal consistency of Cronbach'sα=0.85.Mean
results and standard deviations of the questionnaires and their sub-
scales were as follows: CAS-1: 55.69 (18.90), RRS: 19.48 (5.77), RRS-
Brooding: 10.09 (3.34), RRS-Reflection: 9.38 (3.03), MCQ-30: 58.78
(14.39), Cognitive Confidence: 11.73 (4.46), Positive Beliefs: 9.18
(3.64), Cognitive Self-consciousness: 13.15 (3.78), Uncontrollability
and Danger: 13.00 (4.20), and Need to Control Thoughts: 11.74 (3.81).
A univariate ANOVA revealed a significant difference in CAS-1 levels
between males and females: F(1, 1219) = 13.18, p N 0.001 with a
small effect size d = 0.2 (CI 95% = 0.09–0.32). There was no simple
main effect of age with CAS-1 levels: F(2, 1219) = 2.05, p = 0.13.
There were no significant results for interaction of gender and age
with CAS-1 levels F(2, 1219) = 1.57, p = 0.21. A linear regression
model with CAS-1 scores as response and with demographic variables
and RRS and MCQ-30 subscales as predictors was created to verify the
validity of the CAS-1: F(9, 1215) = 124.24, p b 0.001, R2=0.48. Details
of the model are shown in Table 1.
The confirmatory factor analyses were performed with AMOS for
SPSS (version 24). We created 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-factor models; their de-
tails (fit indices and factor loadings) are presented in Table 2. In each
model, Modification Indices of M.I. ≥ 40were deemed suitable for intro-
ducing intercorrelation between item errors to maximize the fit of the
models to the data while simultaneously avoiding overfitting and en-
suring that conditions for all tested models were similar. Analysis of
BIC indices for different models revealed that the 2-factor and 4-factor
models are characterized by the lowest values of this measure (i.e. the
16 J. Kowalski, M. Dragan / Comprehensive Psychiatry 91 (2019) 13–21best fit for the obtained data). Of these two models, the 2-factor model
appears to be the better fit, ΔBIC = 8.35.
2.4. Conclusions
These results indicate the satisfactory validity and reliability of CAS-
1 measures. They also shed light on gender differences in CAS levels,
with women obtaining higher scores. The analyses performed also indi-
cate that the theory driven [2] 2-factor and 4-factor structures of the
CAS-1 are acceptable and are of good fit to the obtained data, in contrast
to the 3- and 5-factor models, which are also based on theory.
3. Study 2
3.1. Procedure and sample characteristics
The study was conducted via an internet tool for online surveying –
LimeSurvey. Links to the study were shared across social media –
especially clinical psychology and neuropsychology fan-pages andTable 2
Results of factor analyses of CAS-1.
Models and thei
2 factors
CFI 0.92
RMSEA 0.068
χ2 617.94
BIC 923.70
Items and their fa
1. How much time in the last week 
have you found yourself dwelling 
on or worrying about your 
problems?
0.64
2. How much time in the last week 
have you been focusing attention 
on the things you find threatening 
(e.g., symptoms, thoughts, danger)?
0.68
How often 
in the last 
week have 
you done 
the 
following in 
order to 
cope with 
your 
negative 
feelings or 
thoughts?
3. Avoided situations 0.71
4. Tried not to think 
about things 
0.67
5. Used 
alcohol/drugs
0.38
6. Asked for 
reassurance
0.67
7. Tried to control 
my emotions
0.53
8. Tried to control 
my symptoms
0.63students' groups on Facebook. Invitations to the study were supple-
mented with requests to distribute the study to one's social contacts.
Therefore the sampling technique can be characterized as a mix of con-
venience and snowball sampling. A total of 1080 people took part in the
study, and 602 people completed all measures. The dropout rate was
44%, which was not unexpected due to the length of the study. Only
completed surveys were included in the analyses.
The sample had amean age of 31.92 (SD=10.18)with a range from
18 to 75 years. Approximately 77% of the participants were female; 1.5%
of participants did not report their gender identification. Approximately
71% of the participants reported having higher education, 25% had sec-
ondary education, and the rest reported basic or vocational education.
18.3% of participants declared living in a small town with a population
of up to 20 thousand, 18.4% participants declared living in a medium-
sized town with between 20 and 100 thousand inhabitants, and 63.3%
of participants lived in a large city with a population above 100 thou-
sand. The use of the services of a psychiatrist, psychologist, or psycho-
therapist at the time of the study was reported by 18.8% of
participants. This is in-line with data from research on the prevalencer fit indices
3 factors 4 factors 5 factors
0.91 0.92 0.91
0.071 0.068 0.72
683.52 626.29 694.76
975.06 932.05 986.30
ctor loadings
0.62 0.79 0.78
0.65 0.84 0.83
0.70 0.72 0.72
0.66 0.68 0.68
0.36 0.40 0.37
0.66 0.67 0.67
0.53 0.53 0.53
0.63 0.63 0.64
Below are a 9. Worrying too 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.36 
number of 
beliefs 
people have. 
Indicate 
how much 
you believe 
each 
one by 
placing a 
number 
from the 
scale below 
next to each 
item. 
much could harm me 
10. Strong emotions 
are dangerous 
0.43 0.43 0.42 0.42 
11. I cannot control 
my thoughts 
0.71 0.73 0.72 0.75 
12. Some thoughts 
could make me lose 
my mind 
0.70 0.71 0.70 0.70 
13. Worrying helps 
me cope 
0.43 0.59 0.43 0.59 
14. Focusing on 
possible threats can 
keep me safe 
0.34 0.76 0.34 0.76 
15. It is important to 
control my thoughts 
0.35 0.46 0.33 0.45 
16. Analyzing my 
problems will help 
me find answers 
0.14 0.40 0.14 0.40 
CAS-1 – Cognitive-attention Syndrome Questionnaire, CFI – Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA – Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation. Cell colors indicate belonging to certain factors.
Table 2 (continued)
17J. Kowalski, M. Dragan / Comprehensive Psychiatry 91 (2019) 13–21of mental health problems in the Polish population [23] and allows the
sample to be considered a community based one.
3.2. Method and measures
The study employed the assessment tools used in the previous
study: the CAS-1, the RRS (in this study, the “Brooding” and “Reflection”
subscales had acceptable internal consistency, α= 0.77 and 0.73 re-
spectively), and the MCQ-30 (which had excellent internal consistency
in this study, α= 0.90; its subscales' consistencies were acceptable,
with α's ranging from 0.77 to 0.89). It also employed other measures,
described in detail below.
3.2.1. The General Functioning Questionnaire (GFQ-58)
The General Functioning Questionnaire [34] is a checklist-type ques-
tionnaire concerning general functioning and different types of psycho-
pathology symptoms. It consists of 13 subscales with a total of 58 items.
Three concern general functional aspects: poor functioning in thework-
place and at home, lack of entertainment, and poor social relations. Ten
subscales concern various types of symptoms: cognitive impairments,
addictions, positive psychotic symptoms (delusions andhallucinations),
depressive symptoms, manic symptoms, anxiety symptoms, eating dis-
order symptoms, sleep problems, sexual disorders, and somatic symp-
toms. The number of items for subscales varies and can range from 2
(sexual disorders) to 8 (anxiety disorders), with most scales having 4
or 6 items. The total result can vary from 58 to 290 points, where higher
results indicate greater levels of psychopathology symptoms. In the
present study, the questionnaire had good internal consistency (α=
0.89), the internal consistencies of separate subscales are presented
elsewhere [34]. Only results concerning symptom subscales (without
functioning subscales) are presented in this study.3.2.2. The WHO Quality of Life Questionnaire - short version
(WHOQOL-BREF)
WHOQOL-BREF is a 26-item questionnaire developed for measuring
quality of life in four domains: physical health, social relationships, and
psychological and environmental dimensions [35]. The total score on
this questionnaire ranges from 26 to 130, where higher scores indicate
greater quality of life. The Polish version of this questionnaire has ac-
ceptable psychometric properties [36]. In the present study, this ques-
tionnaire had good internal consistency (α= 0.89). The psychological
domain, the only subscale presented here, also had good internal
consistency: α= 0.87.
3.2.3. Method
This studywas designed as a correlative study. The convergent valid-
ity of the CAS-1 was tested with a linear regression model with demo-
graphic variables, and CAS-1, RRS, and MCQ-30 scores as predictors of
various psychopathology symptoms and quality of life. These statistics
were calculated with SPSS 24 software.
3.3. Results of study 2
Themean values of themeasures usedwere as follows: RRS= 45.45
(±12.47), MCQ-30 = 59.43 (±14.38), GFQ-58 = 117.00 (±83.80),
CAS-1 = 55.17 (±19.70), WHOQOL-BREF = 83.80 (±15.85). In this
study, the CAS-1 had internal consistency of α= 0.83. The convergent
validity of the CAS-1 was checked by creating regression models with
demographic variables and CAS-1 scores as predictors of GFQ-58
symptoms subscales, the psychological domain, and total score of
WHOQOL-BREF. These data are presented as Step 1 in Table 3. The sec-
ond step in the regression analysiswas to explore the predictive value of
the CAS-1 for demographic variables and measures of rumination and
Table 3
Results of study 2; variance of different psychopathology symptoms and quality of life as explained by different CAS measures.
GFQ-58 – The General Functioning Questionnaire, WHOQOL-BREF – TheWHO's Quality of Life Questionnaire - Short Version, CAS-1 – Cognitive-attentional Syndrome Questionnaire, RRS-B/R – Ruminative Response Scale, Brooding and
Reflection subscales respectively, MCQ-1 –Metacognitions Questionnaire – Short Version, Cognitive Confidence subscale, MCQ-2 – Positive Beliefs subscale, MCQ-3 – Cognitive Self-consciousness subscale, MCQ-4 – Uncontrollability and
Danger subscale, MCQ-5 – Need to Control Thoughts subscale, * p ≤ 0.001, ° p ≤ 0.01, † p ≤ 0.05.
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19J. Kowalski, M. Dragan / Comprehensive Psychiatry 91 (2019) 13–21metacognitive beliefs. In both steps and for allmodels, the total scores of
the GFQ-58 and WHOQOL-BREF as well as their subscales were signifi-
cant (all p's b 0.001), the percent variance predicted by each model is
presented in the R2 columns in Table 3.
3.4. Conclusions
The results obtained indicate the satisfactory validity and reliability
of the CAS-1. They also show that CAS symptoms are connected with
various kinds of psychopathology symptoms and that these associations
still holdwhen controlling for othermeasures of elements of CAS (rumi-
nation and metacognitive beliefs), which indicates that the CAS-1 has
some unique properties. Regressionmodels (created to show the ability
of the CAS-1 to explain the variance of general psychopathology, various
psychopathology symptoms, and quality of life when controlling for ru-
mination and metacognitive beliefs) indicate that the CAS-1 is partially
correlated with othermeasures of CAS and also possesses a unique abil-
ity to predict a significant amount of the variance of psychopathology
and quality of life. It is worth noting that one of themost important pop-
ular tools for explaining CAS symptoms, apart from the CAS-1, is the RRS
“Brooding” subscale. Also, different sets ofmetacognitive beliefs seem to
play roles in explaining the variability of different types of symptoms.
Therefore it may be concluded that assessment of CAS levels could be
enhanced by combining different CASmeasuring tools whichwould en-
sure that a larger percentage of the variance would be explained, thus
ensuring the smallest measurement error possible.
4. Study 3
4.1. Procedure and sample characteristics
This study was conducted before an fMRI study in the Laboratory of
Brain Imaging of the Institute of Experimental Biology of the Polish
Academy of Sciences. Participants who took part in both parts of the
study (diagnosis + fMRI) were given about 50 EUR in return. From par-
ticipants of Study 1 (N = 1225), two extreme groups were selected,
each with 134 participants. As the results of Study 2 suggest that com-
bining tools which measure aspects of CAS predicts a greater amount
of variance in psychopathology symptoms, a combination of measures
was used in forming the two groups. The criteria for inclusion were
obtaining scores above the 66th percentile or below the 33rd percentile
on all of the following measures: the CAS-1, the “Brooding” subscale of
the RRS (as this aspect of rumination is most prominently connected
to emotional disorder) [cf. 37], and the “Need for Control” and “Uncon-
trollability and Danger” subscales from the MCQ-30, as these aspects of
metacognitive beliefs are most prominently connected to levels of anx-
iety and depression [cf. 25,32,38,39]. Participants were invited to the
study in random order and affiliation to groups was blinded. In the
end, 98 participants took part in the present study: 44 from the High-
CAS (HCAS) group and 54 from the Low-CAS (LCAS) group. Participants
were first interviewed with SCID-I and were then asked to fill-in ques-
tionnaires. The study took about 2 h to complete.
4.2. Measures
In this study, the following measures presented in previous sections
were used: the CAS-1, the RSS (α=0.96), and the MCQ-30 (α=0.93).
Other measures were also used, which are described in detail below.
4.2.1. Structured clinical interview for DSM-IV-TR (SCID-I)
The SCID-I is a tool for the assessment of past and current psychiatric
diagnoses but is limited to Axis I disorders – psychological disorders and
mental illnesses, but not personality and developmental disorders [40].
It is based on DSM-IV-TR criteria [41]. This interview was administered
by a trained clinical psychologist and psychotherapist (MD) with theuse of the B/Cmodule, as any psychotic symptomswere an exclusion cri-
terion. The Polish adaptation of SCID-I (research version) was used [42].
4.2.2. Symptom checklist 27 plus (SCL-27-plus)
This is a checklist-type questionnaire that measures depressive, vege-
tative, agoraphobic, social phobia, andpain symptoms [43], and allows the
calculation of a general symptoms index (GSI). The results on each scale
can range from 0 to 20, where higher scores indicate higher levels of a
given symptom. In this study, the Polish adaptation of the questionnaire
was used [44], and it had an excellent internal consistency of α= 0.93.
4.3. Results of study 3
In this study, the CAS-1 had an internal consistency of α= 0.91. In
general, the groups did not differ in demographic measures, except
that the HCAS group hadmore females (χ2=7.81, p=0.005; Cramér's
phi=0.29). Therewere significant differences betweenHCAS and LCAS
groups in symptoms reported on the CAS-1 (U = 73.5, p b 0.001;
Cohen's d = 2.7, d CI 95% = 2.15–3.25), RRS Brooding (U = 117, p b
0.001; Cohen's d=2.35, d CI 95%=1.84–2.87),MCQ-30Uncontrollabil-
ity and Danger (U = 105.5, p b 0.001; Cohen's d = 2.41, d CI 95% =
1.89–2.93), MCQ-30 Need to Control Thoughts (U = 161, p b 0.001;
Cohen's d = 2.20, d CI 95% = 1.70–2.70), as well as SCL-27-plus GSI
(U = 148, p b 0.001; Cohen's d = 2.14, d CI 95% = 1.65–2.64). Thus,
the HCAS group scored significantly higher, on average, on all measures
than did the LCAS group.
Analyses of SCID-I results revealed that Axis I disorders occurred sig-
nificantly more often in the HCAS group. A lifetime diagnosis was
established in 31 (70%) participants in the HCAS group in comparison
to 6 (11%) in the LCAS group (χ2= 36.33, df= 1, p b 0.001, Cramér's
V=0.61). A current diagnosis was established in 18 (41%) HCAS partic-
ipants in comparison to 3 (6%) LCAS participants (χ2=18.00, df=1, p
b 0.001, Cramér's V = 0.43). Relative risk for lifetime diagnosis in the
HCAS groupwas RR=6.34 (CI 95%=2.91–13.80) and for current diag-
nosis was RR = 7.36 (CI 95% = 2.32–23.39).
Current diagnoses in the HCAS group were as follows: 9 (50% of the
sample) had anxiety disorders (i.e. GAD, social phobia, specific phobia),
4 (22%) had mood disorders (i.e. MDD, dysthymic disorder), 3 (17%)
had PTSD comorbid with another Axis I disorder, and 2 (11%) had
other disorders. Current diagnoses in the LCAS group were: 1 had
PTSD, 1 had an anxiety disorder NOS, and 1 alcohol abuse disorder. Life-
time diagnoses in the HCAS group were as follows: 8 (26%) had anxiety
disorders, 4 (13%) had mood disorders, 7 (23%) had comorbid anxiety
and mood disorders, 5 (16%) had PTSD and anxiety and/or mood disor-
ders, and the remaining 6 (19%) fulfilled criteria for other disorders.
Lifetime diagnoses in the LCAS group were: 2 (33%) anxiety disorder
NOS, and 4 other: 1 MDD comorbid with another Axis I disorder, 1
PTSD, 1 minor depressive disorder, and 1 alcohol abuse disorder.
Inclusion in the HCAS and LCAS groups on the basis of questionnaire
results in the context of the presence of a lifetime diagnosis had sensi-
tivity of 70% (CI 95% = 55%–83%) and specificity of 89% (CI 95% =
77%–96%). The positive predictive value was 84% (CI 95% = 70%–92%),
the negative predictive value was 79% (CI 95% = 70%–85%), while
the overall accuracy (sum of true positives and negatives divided by
all results) of selection based on questionnaires was 81% (CI 95% =
71%–88%).
4.4. Conclusions
The results obtained indicate satisfactory reliability of the CAS-1 and
satisfactory validity of a combination of the CAS-1, the “Brooding” sub-
scale from the RRS, and two subscales from theMCQ-30. These measur-
ing tools have satisfactory overall accuracy in detecting psychological
disorders in a sample of people not currently undergoing psychiatric
treatment. High levels of CAS aremostly connected tomood and anxiety
20 J. Kowalski, M. Dragan / Comprehensive Psychiatry 91 (2019) 13–21disorders and PTSD diagnoses. High levels of CAS symptoms are also
connected to greater levels of psychopathology and pain symptoms.
5. General discussion
The aim of the presented studies was to explore the psychometric
qualities of the CAS-1. The first study explored the validity and reliability
of the CAS-1, its factor structure, and age and gender differences across a
large community sample. The validity of the CAS-1was explored through
its relationships with metacognition and rumination questionnaires. The
second study explored the validity of the CAS-1 through its relationships
with a general functioning and psychopathology questionnaire and a
quality of life questionnaire. The reliability of the CAS-1was also explored.
This study also allowed the identification of what amount of variance of
psychopathology symptoms is explained by the CAS-1 when controlling
for measures of metacognitive beliefs and rumination. The third study
aimed to explore the predictive validity of CAS as a theoretical construct
by ascertaining diagnoses in people with high and low levels of CAS. In
light of results from the second study, the authors decided to broaden
the questionnaire-based selection to other measures of elements of CAS:
rumination and metacognitive beliefs. Subgroups based on the results of
the CAS-1, the RRS's “Brooding” subscale, and the MCQ-30's “Need to
Control Thoughts” and “Uncontrollability and Danger” subscales were di-
agnosedwith a SCID-I structured interviewandparticipants' levels of psy-
chopathology symptoms were measured with the SCL-27-plus
questionnaire.
There were gender differences in the CAS-1 results. This may result
from gender differences in perceived levels of stress – women tend to
obtain higher results on such measures [45–47], which may indicate
that women are more prone to CAS because of higher levels of stressful
events or a greater tendency to perceive events as stressful.Women also
use emotional and avoidance styles to cope with stress more often [47].
It is noteworthy that these stylesmay be identified as elements of CAS –
rumination [18] or thought suppression [6]. In particular, studies show
that women aremore likely thanmen to use rumination [48]. Likely be-
cause of this tendency, random selection in study 3 yielded a greater
number of women in the HCAS group.
Four different theory driven factorial models of the CAS-1 were
tested. All models had acceptable fit indices but χ2 and BIC values indi-
cate that the 2- and 4- factor models are a better fit to the data than the
others and that the 2-factormodel is superior to the 4-factormodel. This
may be understood as an indication that CAS-1 items can be easily di-
vided into measures of cognitive and behavioral strategies on one
hand and metacognitive beliefs on the other hand. But it should also
be taken into account that the CAS-1 has only two items regarding
basic CAS cognitive activities: repetitive negative thinking and threat
monitoring. Itmay be hypothesized that the 4-factor structure proposed
by Wells [2] would be preferable in a measuring tool with a more
comprehensive assessment of those aspects, if such tool were to be
devised.
The correlation analyses in studies 1 and 2 are in line with Wells'
theory [2] and previous research which used the CAS-1 [15–17]. CAS-1
results have a medium-strength relationship with the measures of
metacognitive beliefs and rumination. This indicates the construct va-
lidity of the CAS-1. CAS-1 results are also correlated with medium
strength with levels of psychopathology symptoms (partial r= 0.67),
and quality of life (partial r = −0.57) and its psychological domain
(partial r = −0.57). This serves as a concurrent validity indicator.
CAS-1 results are associated with different types of symptoms, not just
depressive (partial r = 0.62) and anxiety symptoms (partial r =
0.63), which are known to be primarily linked to CAS levels [15,16].
They are also linkedwith other types of psychopathology such as cogni-
tive deficits (partial r = 0.50), manic symptoms (partial r = 0.47),
psychotic symptoms (partial r = 0.31), sexual disorder symptoms
(partial r= 0.38), sleep disturbances (partial r= 0.42) [cf. 17], and so-
matic disorders (partial r = 0.45). This indicates the transdiagnosticcharacter of CAS. However, it is important to note that the strongest re-
lationships between CAS scores and disorder symptoms are with symp-
toms of depression and anxiety. This leads to the hypothesis that CAS is
not only a key factor in the development of emotional disorders, which
is in linewithWells' theory [2], but that it alsomay be amoderating fac-
tor in relationships between levels of psychopathology and subjective
distress related to symptoms. It also may be hypothesized that levels
of CAS are a moderating factor for relationships of mechanisms or risk
factors of mental illnesses with subjectively rated levels of psychopa-
thology symptoms. This would be associated with the high levels of
comorbidity of various mental disorders, especially when anxiety or
mood disorders are part of a diagnosis [49]. These hypotheses remain
to be tested in further studies.
Most of these associations (apart from the Positive Symptoms sub-
scale) remain with diminished strength after introducing other CAS vari-
ables (RRS and MCQ-30 subscales) to the regression models. More
complex models explain a greater percentage of the variance of psycho-
pathology symptoms and quality of life; the role of the CAS-1 in these
models is smaller but CAS-1 scores are still significant predictors of the re-
sponse variables, evenwhen taking RRS andMCQ-30 scores into account.
This may indicate some unique component of the CAS-1 in relation to
these two measuring tools, which have been previously used to assess
levels of CAS [10,12,13]. However, the creator of the CAS-1 [2] states
that this measure is mostly for clinical use and for rare cases when it is
not known which tool for the assessment of disorder-specific CAS symp-
toms is of use. Thismay indicate that devising a thoroughCASmeasure for
use in scientific and clinical studies is appropriate. Such ameasure should
take into account all CAS components – worry, rumination, threat-
sensitivity (internal and external), and, most strongly connected to emo-
tional disorders metacognitive beliefs. Such a measure was simulated in
the third study with the use of a combination of CAS-related measures.
The overall accuracy of the questionnaire-based diagnosis had an
acceptable value of 71%–88%. There is medium probability of being diag-
nosed with a psychological disorder when in the HCAS group, and high
probability of not receiving such a diagnosis when in the LCAS group. It
should be noted that these values are considered acceptable because of
the highly pre-selected sample. Potential participantswhowere undergo-
ing any kind of psychiatric treatment orwere generally unfit for participa-
tion in an fMRI were not included in studies 1 and 3. Bearing inmind that
the sample explored in study 3 consisted of individualswhowere by their
own declaration “fit for the study”, the obtained accuracy may be consid-
ered acceptable and serve as proof of the validity of a CAS diagnosis based
on questionnaires and of the questionnaires' ability to distinguish be-
tween people with current and past psychological disorders as well as
those who do not have a disorder.
As with all research, these studies have limitations. Concerning the
samples: the sample in study 1 was supposed to mirror the population
of Warsaw, instead it contained slightly more women and was better
educated than the population. Study 2 was also not balanced in terms
of gender and education – the participants were mostly women and
people with higher education. Study 3, which consisted of subsamples
from study 1, was pre-selected in terms of excluding participants who
were undergoing psychiatric treatment and unsuitable for an fMRI
study. These exclusion criteria do not allow this sample to be considered
a community one and diminishes the ecological validity of the study. It
may be hypothesized that in a group of high-CAS individuals there
would be a higher percent of people with psychiatric disorders and ill-
nesses who were unable to participate in this study due to undergoing
some kind of treatment. It may also be hypothesized that the group of
people with severe levels of CAS greatly overlapped with the group of
people with severe psychological disorders who are thus unable or un-
willing to participate in any kind of scientific study. For example, people
with agoraphobia would not want to travel to an unknown location,
people with claustrophobia would not want to partake in an fMRI
study, etc. On the other hand, it could perhaps be suggested that people
with some notion of their psychological disturbances were more prone
21J. Kowalski, M. Dragan / Comprehensive Psychiatry 91 (2019) 13–21to participate in the studywith themotivation of “checking themselves”
and obtaining a psychological diagnosis free of charge.
6. Conclusions
The main conclusions of the studies discussed are as follows:
1. The CAS-1 has satisfactory reliability and validity.
2. Two and four factor structures of the CAS-1 were confirmed. The
two-factor model had the best fit to the data in the large sample ex-
amined and in comparison to other proposed factor structures.
3. CAS may be perceived as a vulnerability factor for the development
and continuance of various psychopathological symptoms.
4. High levels of CAS are connected with the occurrence of mood and
anxiety disorders and PTSD.
5. The CAS-1was devised for clinical purposes and, thanks to its brevity,
may be useful in such a setting. For research purposes it would be
helpful to devise a more extensive measure of CAS.
6. A combination of items from the worry, rumination, and
metacognitive beliefs questionnaires with items concerning behav-
ioral aspects of CAS could serve as such a measure.
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Aim: Cognitive-attentional syndrome (CAS) is the main factor underlying depressive
and anxiety disorders in the metacognitive approach to psychopathology and
psychotherapy. This study explore neural correlates of this syndrome during induced
negative thinking, abstract thinking, and resting states.
Methods: n = 25 people with high levels of CAS and n = 33 people with low levels
of CAS were chosen from a population-based sample (N = 1225). These groups
filled-in a series of measures of CAS, negative affect, and psychopathology; they also
underwent a modified rumination induction procedure and a resting state fMRI session.
Resonance imaging data were analyzed using static general linear model and functional
connectivity approaches.
Results: The two groups differed with large effect sizes on all used measures of
CAS, negative affect, and psychopathology. We did not find any group differences
in general linear model analyses. Functional connectivity analyses showed that high
levels of CAS were related to disrupted patterns of connectivity within and between
various brain networks: the default mode network, the salience network, and the central
executive network.
Conclusion: We showed that low- and high-CAS groups differed in functional
connectivity during induced negative and abstract thinking and also in resting state fMRI.
Overall, our results suggest that people with high levels of CAS tend to have disrupted
neural processing related to self-referential processing, task-oriented processing, and
emotional processing.
Keywords: repetitive negative thinking, cognitive-attentional syndrome, rumination, resting state, fMRI,
neural correlates
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive-attentional syndrome (CAS) is a key construct in
Wells’ metacognitive theory of emotional disorders (Wells
and Matthews, 1994; Wells, 2009). In the Self-Regulatory
Executive Function (S-REF) model, CAS is a set of psychological
processes that includes repetitive negative thinking (worry and
rumination), threat monitoring, and associated unhelpful
behavioral and cognitive strategies; it is derived from
metacognitive beliefs, either positive (e.g., “If I ruminate I will
understand my situation”) or negative (e.g., “I cannot control my
ruminative thoughts”). While moments of negative self-appraisal
are relatively brief in most people, the prolonged occurrence of
negative emotions and negative self-appraisal in some people
is due to recurring activation of CAS. This specific style of
responding to negative thoughts is considered a transdiagnostic
factor which underlies emotional disorders. Many studies have
confirmed the relationship of CAS with emotional distress as
well as symptoms of mood and anxiety disorders (Fergus et al.,
2012, 2013). According to the metacognitive model, CAS is a
prominent factor in the development of mood disorders, e.g.,
major depressive disorder (MDD; Papageorgiou and Wells, 2001,
2003, 2009; Wells, 2009), anxiety disorders, e.g., generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD; Wells, 1999, 2005, 2007, 2009), post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Wells and Sembi, 2004; Wells,
2009; Bennett and Wells, 2010), and obsessive-compulsive
disorder (OCD; Fisher and Wells, 2005; Myers et al., 2009a,b;
Wells, 2009; Solem et al., 2010).
A fundamental element of CAS is a pattern of negative,
pervasive, and recurring thoughts. Rumination is associated
with decreased attentional resources (Donaldson et al., 2007;
Koster et al., 2011), the occurrence of negative emotions, and
difficulties with problem solving (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
A ruminative thinking style is most often associated with mood
disorders, as it is a risk factor for the development of depression
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) and is generally associated with
dysphoric and depressive mood (Mor and Winquist, 2002).
However, rumination is not only present in mood disorders –
it also plays a prominent role in the symptomatology of other
emotional and psychiatric disorders, such as anxiety or eating
disorders (Olatunji et al., 2013). Pathological worry, another
form of extended thinking, is considered a key feature of GAD;
however, many researchers have shown that it also occurs in
other types of emotional disorders (e.g., Starcevic et al., 2007;
Spinhoven et al., 2015).
To date, there have been no studies on brain functioning
in people with high levels of CAS – i.e., elevated levels
of CAS-related symptomatology: repetitive negative thinking,
attention to threats, unhelpful coping behaviors, and maladaptive
metacognitive beliefs. There are, however, some studies using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) methods in
which induction of core aspects of CAS – rumination (state
rumination rather than trait rumination; Cooney et al., 2010;
Berman et al., 2014; Burkhouse et al., 2017) or worry (Paulesu
et al., 2010) – has been employed. The first two of the
aforementioned studies on rumination induction compared
depressed participants to healthy controls, while the third
compared adolescents with remitted MDD to healthy controls.
The Rumination Induction task used in an fMRI setting by
Cooney et al. (2010) consisted of alternating blocks of ruminative,
concrete, and abstract sentences which participants were asked to
think about (e.g., “think about the expectations people have for
you”). In this procedure, ruminative sentences, in comparison to
concrete/abstract sentences, were associated with altered activity
in brain regions involved in emotion processing and regulation in
depressed patients: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, cingulate
cortices, amygdalae, and parahippocampi (Cooney et al., 2010).
Another study compared resting state functional connectivity
with functional connectivity during negative mood induction
using personalized cues created by ruminating on negative
autobiographical events (e.g., “Please recall a specific time when
you were very embarrassed”; Berman et al., 2014). This study
showed that depressed patients had stronger connections within
brain regions belonging to the default mode network (DMN),
like the cingulate cortex. It was suggested that these results
may be understood as difficulty in down-regulating self-oriented
emotional and cognitive processing after rumination induction
(Berman et al., 2014). A fourth study (Burkhouse et al., 2017)
found that rumination induction with prior negative mood
induction (e.g., “Remember when you failed badly at something”)
elicits stronger neural activations in regions involved in the DMN
and emotion processing in remitted MDD adolescents. A study
by Paulesu et al. (2010) explored differences in worrying between
patients with GAD and healthy controls. Sentences which induce
worrying (e.g., “Mull over what worries you about your future”)
were related to activation in the anterior cingulate and dorsal
medial prefrontal cortex in the GAD group.
Several recent meta-analyses on neuronal functioning in
people with depression (Hamilton et al., 2012; Palmer et al.,
2015), specific phobias (Ipser et al., 2013), and PTSD (Simmons
and Matthews, 2012) show, in general, that emotional disorders
are most prominently connected to the dysregulation of
subcortical brain areas involved in emotion processing, i.e.,
the amygdalae and hippocampi, as well as the striatum. This
dysregulation is interpreted as the overdeveloped salience of
threatening or saddening stimuli. Also, several cortical regions
are involved in this type of processing, like the insulae and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices. Studies on repetitive negative
thinking induction and large meta-analyses on emotional
disorders have found that people experiencing mood and anxiety
disorders exhibit dysregulation of the default mode, salience,
and executive networks. Overall, people with emotional disorders
demonstrate a pattern of disrupted neural processing in the
areas of self-referential, task-oriented, and emotional processing
(Hamilton et al., 2012; Simmons and Matthews, 2012; Ipser et al.,
2013; Palmer et al., 2015).
In the current study, we aimed to explore differences in neural
functioning between people with high and low levels of CAS
symptoms. Given that there are no previous studies on the
neural correlates of CAS, we decided to base our hypotheses
on available work on repetitive negative thinking induction
and meta-analytical results regarding emotional disorders which,
according to metacognitive theory, are undergirded by CAS. We
hypothesized that people with high levels of CAS symptoms
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 648
fpsyg-10-00648 March 22, 2019 Time: 17:57 # 3
Kowalski et al. Neural Correlates of Cognitive-Attentional Syndrome
will show similar patterns of cortical activations to those
found in studies on neural correlates of depressive and anxiety
disorders, as described above. To test these hypotheses, we
employed a modified Rumination Induction procedure and
resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rsfMRI).
We expected that differences in neural activation in people with
high levels of CAS symptoms (HCAS) would be comparable to
the patterns of activation reported by Cooney et al. (2010) in
depressed patients, with greater neural activity in the amygdalae,
hippocampi, and cingulate and dorsolateral cortices in the
rumination condition as compared to the abstract condition.
We also hypothesized that the cortical regions associated with
rumination and which show aberrant activity in emotional
disorders will show different patterns of functional connectivity
in the HCAS group in comparison to the group with low
levels of CAS symptoms (LCAS). We expected to find disrupted
patterns of connectivity within and between several neural
networks: the DMN, the salience network, and the central
executive network (CEN).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Procedure and Sample Selection
Participation in the study was voluntary and participants gave
their informed consent. The study was approved by the Research
Ethics Committee at the Faculty of Psychology, University of
Warsaw. The study was conducted in two stages. The first stage
took place through an Internet survey panel and was conducted
by an external company. A large sample was gathered for the
purpose of an fMRI study, so there were standard strict exclusion
criteria related to the fMRI procedure (left-handedness, metal
objects within the body, irremovable piercings, etc.) as well as any
history of neurological or serious mental disorders or substance
abuse disorders. Participants were also required to live in the
Warsaw area to ensure their ability to participate in the second
stage of the study. A total of 1,225 participants were eligible and
completed the first stage of the study. Participants were selected
based on quotas mirroring the population of Warsaw (Central
Statistical Office, 2017) in terms of sex, age, and education.
Figure 1 depicts the selection procedure from the first to the final
stage of the study.
From the first stage participants, two extreme groups were
selected. As the results of previous studies (Kowalski and Dragan,
2019) have suggested that combining different measures of
aspects of CAS is best for predicting levels of psychopathology,
several measures were used in forming the two groups. The cut-
off criterion was a score above the 66th percentile or below the
33rd percentile of the sum of results on the following measures:
the CAS-1 questionnaire, the Brooding subscale of the RRS
(as this aspect of rumination is most robustly associated with
depressive and anxiety disorders, cf. Olatunji et al., 2013), and
the Need to Control Thoughts as well as the Uncontrollability
and Danger subscales from the MCQ-30, as these aspects of
metacognitive beliefs are most prominently connected to levels
of anxiety and depression (cf. Wells and Cartwright-Hatton,
2004; Spada et al., 2008; Dragan and Dragan, 2011; Sarisoy
FIGURE 1 | Consort flow-chart of enrollment and samples selection for the
study.
et al., 2014). Finally two extreme groups, each consisting of 134
subjects, were formed.
The second stage of the study took part in the Laboratory
of Brain Imaging, Neurobiology Center, Nencki Institute of
Experimental Biology, Polish Academy of Sciences. Participants
were invited to the laboratory in a random order by a person
from an external company. Researchers were blinded to the
participants’ group affiliation. A total of 89 participants took
part in the study – 43 in the HCAS group and 46 in the LCAS
group. Participants who underwent the whole fMRI procedure
were given a sum of money equivalent to about 50 EUR.
The second stage of the study occurred 4–22 weeks after the
first stage, depending on the timing of the participants’ second
stage appointment. Despite the acceptable time-stability of the
questionnaire results between the first and second stages of the
study (correlations of results at these two time points: CAS-
1: r = 0.83, p < 0.001, RRS – Brooding: r = 0.82, p < 0.001,
MCQ – Need to Control Thoughts: r = 0.76, p < 0.001, MCQ –
Uncontrollability and Danger: r = 0.82, p < 0.001) some shift
in individual results was observed. To ensure that both groups
had extreme characteristics, participants had to have results above
or below median on all four measures used in the study. As
a result, 31 participants were excluded: 30 had mixed results
and 1 “changed groups” as this participant had HCAS results
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TABLE 1 | Group characteristics – demographic and clinical variables.
HCAS (n = 25) LCAS (n = 33) t-Test p-Value Cohen’s d (90% CI)
Sex 72% females 42% females 5.03∗ 0.025 0.30∗∗
Age 30.40 (7.26) 33.48 (5.85) −1.74 0.089
CAS-1 75.90 (9.98) 23.88 (11.21) 18.33 < 0.001 4.90 (4.04–5.77)
RRS-brooding 15.72 (2.57) 7.09 (1.81) 14.30 < 0.001 3.88 (3.15–4.62)
MCQ-30 Need to control thoughts 16.64 (2.64) 7.67 (1.51) 15.19 < 0.001 4.17 (3.40–4.94)
Uncontrollability and danger 19.28 (2.99) 8.70 (2.79) 13.87 < 0.001 3.66 (2.95–4.37)
SCL-27 plus Depression 9.63 (4.32) 0.62 (1.04) 9.99 < 0.001 2.87 (2.25–3.48)
Vegetative symptoms 8.28 (3.35) 3.88 (3.05) 5.22 < 0.001 1.37 (0.89–1.85)
Agoraphobic symptoms 4.64 (2.91) 0.52 (1.06) 6.75 < 0.001 1.88 (1.36–2.4)
Sociophobic symptoms 11.04 (2.47) 2.67 (2.17) 13.68 < 0.001 3.6 (2.90–4.30)
Pain 9.72 (3.02) 5.90 (2.45) 5.30 < 0.001 1.39 (0.91–1.87)
Total score 43.46 (9.69) 13.72 (7.06) 13.30 < 0.001 3.51 (2.82–4.20)
∗Chi-squared test; ∗∗Cramer’s Phi; CAS-1, Cognitive-Attentional Syndrome Questionnaire; RRS-brooding, Ruminative Response Scale - brooding subscale; MCQ-30,
Metacognitions Questionnaire - Short Version; SCL-27 plus, Symptoms Checklist 27-plus.
on the internet measures but LCAS results on the day of the
fMRI scan. Ultimately, data from 58 participants (HCAS = 25,
LCAS = 33) were analyzed and are presented in this paper.
Group demographic characteristics are presented in Table 1.
These groups were also clinically diagnosed with a SCID-I
interview but full results are presented elsewhere (Kowalski and
Dragan, 2019; Dragan and Kowalski, unpublished). A total of
45% of participants from the HCAS group and none from LCAS
group met the diagnostic criteria for a current diagnosis of a
psychological disorder. In the HCAS group, 12 participants were
diagnosed according to DSM-IV-TR criteria with: MDD (1),
dysthymic disorder (1), GAD (2), GAD comorbid with social
phobia (1), GAD comorbid with social phobia and dysthymic
disorder (1), PTSD comorbid with MDD (1), PTSD comorbid
with social phobia (1), PTSD comorbid with binge eating
(1), cyclothymic disorder comorbid with bulimia nervosa (1),
depressive disorder NOS (1), and anxiety disorder NOS (1).
All participants were treatment-naive and diagnosis-naive at
the beginning of the study. The second stage of the procedure
consisted of filling-in questionnaires (CAS-1, RRS, MCQ-30,
SCL-27) followed by the MRI procedure, including: a T1-
weighted structural scan, rsfMRI, and a Rumination Induction
procedure. This MRI procedure lasted approximately 40 min
in total and constituted a part of a larger MRI study. After
the MRI procedure, participants filled-in PANAS and STAI
questionnaires. A schematic representation of the procedure is
displayed in Figure 2.
Measures and Materials
The Cognitive-Attentional Syndrome Questionnaire
(CAS-1)
The CAS-1 questionnaire (Wells, 2009) consists of 16 items
measuring aspects of CAS: worry/rumination, attention to threat,
maladaptive behaviors, and metacognitive beliefs. The results
of the questionnaire were calculated as in the paper by Fergus
et al. (2012) – the last eight items were recalculated to range
between 0 and 8 before summing them up. The total results
range from 0 to 128, where a higher result indicates a greater
FIGURE 2 | Schematic diagram of the study procedure.
level of CAS. The psychometric qualities of the Polish version
of CAS-1 are presented elsewhere (Kowalski and Dragan, 2019).
In the current study, CAS-1 had excellent internal consistency of
Cronbach’s α = 0.91.
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS)
The 22-item Ruminative Response Scale focuses on one’s
responses to depressive mood: concentration on the self,
symptoms, and the causes and consequences of depressive mood.
A newer approach (Treynor et al., 2003) distinguishes two
subscales: “Reflection” and “Brooding.” Only the results of the
latter are presented in this study. This subscale consists of five
items with results ranging from 5 to 20, where a higher result
indicates a greater tendency to respond to depressed mood
with brooding. The Polish version of the RRS has generally
good psychometric qualities (Kornacka et al., 2016). In the
current study, the Brooding subscale had internal consistency of
Cronbach’s α = 0.88.
Metacognitions Questionnaire – Short Version
(MCQ-30)
The short version of the Metacognitions Questionnaire,
developed by Wells and Cartwright-Hatton (2004), consists of
five subscales and 30 items. It concerns metacognitive beliefs:
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monitoring techniques, judgments, and beliefs about one’s
thoughts and cognitive abilities central to the metacognitive
model of psychopathology. Two subscales are of interest in
present study: the “Uncontrollability and Danger” scale explores
the negative aspects of worry, e.g., “My worrying is dangerous
for me” and the “Need to Control Thoughts” scale deals with
beliefs about the negative consequences of not controlling one’s
thoughts, e.g., “Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign
of weakness.” The Polish version of this questionnaire exhibits
good psychometric qualities and is considered equivalent to
the English version (Dragan and Dragan, 2011). In this study,
these two MCQ-30 subscales had good internal consistencies of
α = 0.89 and α = 0.84, respectively.
Symptom Checklist 27 Plus (SCL-27-Plus)
This is a checklist-type questionnaire that measures depressive,
vegetative, agoraphobic, sociophobic, and pain symptoms (Hardt,
2008), and it allows the calculation of a global severity index
(GSI). The results on each scale can range from 0 to 20,
where higher scores indicate higher levels of a given symptom.
In this study, the Polish adaptation of the questionnaire was
used (Kuncewicz et al., 2014) and it had an excellent internal
consistency of Cronbach’s α = 0.93.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
This is a comprehensive measure of emotions with two distinct
subscales of positive and negative affect (Watson et al., 1988).
In this study, a Polish adaptation of the 30-item PANAS-
state questionnaire, which has good psychometric qualities,
was used (Brzozowski et al., 2010). In the current study,
the internal consistencies of its subscales were α = 0.82 and
α = 0.80, respectively.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)
A widely used measurement of anxiety and its cognitive and
vegetative components (Spielberger et al., 1970). In this study,
a Polish adaptation of the STAI-state questionnaire, which has
good psychometric qualities, was used (Wrzes´niewski et al.,
2002). In the current study, the internal consistency was
Cronbach’s α = 0.93.
Resting State fMRI
The resting state procedure consisted of a fixation cross being
shown for 10 min on the MRI display (cf. Birn et al., 2013; Patriat
et al., 2013). Subjects were instructed to fix their gaze on the cross
and to not move.
Modified Rumination Induction (RumInd-M) fMRI Task
During rumination induction, participants are asked to think
about sentences that are designed to induce the process
of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1993). The
sentences deal with themes of the reader’s own emotions,
appraisals, and experiences. In this task, we used the mix of
stimuli used by Cooney et al. (2010; rumination induction)
and by Paulesu et al. (2010; worry induction) to obtain
a robust repetitive negative thinking effect in participants.
We used the modified procedure from Cooney et al. (2010)
with ruminative/worrying sentences (e.g., “Think about the
opportunities you didn’t take in your life,” “Think about what
worries you have about your health”; RUM), and abstract
sentences (e.g., “Think about how a plant grows”; ABS) as
a control condition (see Appendix 1 for all stimuli used).
Participants were asked to think about sentences presented on
screen and to try to clear their minds when a cross appeared
on screen. Each sentence was presented on screen for 30 s and
sentences were separated by 10 s of a fixation cross. Four blocks of
five sentences were presented in a non-consecutive order (RUM-
ABS-RUM-ABS). After each block, participants assessed their
sadness, anxiety, and engagement in thinking on a 1–5 Likert
scale. Results from this task are the totals of the assessments from
both blocks of the same type. The task lasted about 15 min. Two
parallel versions of rumination induction were used. Versions
did not differ on any of the results (all values of p > 0.05) and
administration of the versions did not differ between HCAS and
LCAS groups, χ2 = 0.43, p = 0.51.
Behavior Analysis
Internal consistency was calculated with Cronbach’s α. Group
differences were analyzed with Student’s t-test for independent
samples orχ2 for nominal data, group differences were calculated
to demonstrate effect sizes using Cohen’s d. Data were analyzed
with IBM SPSS 24, effect sizes were calculated using an
online calculator1.
MRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
Data were acquired using a 3T Siemens MAGNETOM Trio
system (Siemens Medical Solutions) equipped with a 12-channel
head coil: structural T1-weighted image (TR: 2,530 ms, TE:
3.32 ms, flip angle: 7◦, voxel size: 1 × 1 × 1 mm, field of view:
256 mm, measurements: 1), rsfMRI (TR: 2,000 ms, TE: 28 ms,
flip angle: 80◦, voxel size: 3 × 3 × 3 mm, field of view: 216 mm,
measurements: 200), and task fMRI (TR: 2,500 ms, TE: 28 ms,
flip angle: 80◦, voxel size: 3 × 3 × 3 mm, field of view: 216,
measurements: 364). After the rsfMRI and rumination induction
tasks, B0 inhomogeneity field maps were collected (TR: 400 ms,
TE: 4.5 ms/6.96 ms, flip angle: 60◦, voxel size: 3× 3× 3 mm, field
of view: 216 mm, measurements: 1).
The DICOM series were converted to NIfTI and BIDS
data formats with Horos Bids Output2. Spatial preprocessing
was performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM123).
Functional images were corrected for distortions related
to magnetic field inhomogeneity, corrected for motion by
realignment to the first acquired image, slice-timed, normalized
to the MNI space, and resliced to obtain a resolution of
2 × 2 × 2 mm, and smoothed with the 6 mm FWHM Gaussian
kernel. Before normalization, structural images were coregistered
to the mean functional image and segmented into separate tissues
using the default tissue probability maps. Functional data were
also analyzed with the Artifact Detection Toolbox (ART4). Any
EPI which deviated from the previous one by 3SD, 1.6 mm, or
1https://www.psychometrica.de/effect_size.html
2https://github.com/mslw/horos-bids-output
3http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
4https://www.nitrc.org/projects/artifact_detect
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0.04 rad was considered an outlier and such EPIs were regressed
out in the 1st level models. Averages of 4.12%, SD = 2.64%,
of scans for the rumination induction task and of 4.74%,
SD = 4.13%, of scans for rsfMRI were regressed out. Participants
with more than 20% outliers were excluded from the analyses.
Based on these criteria no participants were excluded. There
were no differences between groups in the number of outliers
in the rumination induction task (t = 0.23, p = 0.82) or in the
resting state (t = −1.76, p = 0.08), there were also no differences
in the number of outliers between RUM and ABS conditions
(t = 0.23, p = 0.82). Functional data were high pass filtered
(1,000 s for rumination induction and 128 s for rsfMRI), and
fixation crosses in the rumination induction task were modeled
as baseline. Data were analyzed as a flexible factorial model of
group × condition activation and with a two sample t-test of
RUM > ABS and ABS > RUM contrasts. A regressor with a mock
variable for gender was added to the second level models. On a
group level, a voxel-wise height threshold of p < 0.05 corrected
for multiple comparisons using the family wise error (FWE) rate
was employed for whole brain analyses. Thresholded fMRI maps
and raw data are available to any researcher upon request.
Functional Connectivity Analyses
The CONN (ver. 185) toolbox was used to perform functional
connectivity analyses. First level SPM files and functional data for
the resting state and rumination induction were imported into
the software. Data were denoised with use of the respective T1-
weighted scans, normalized to MNI-space, with eight regressors
for WM and seven regressors for CSF, and with movement
parameters obtained with the ART toolbox. The acceptance
threshold for denoised signal voxel-to-voxel correlations was
on average r ≤ 0.1. Resting state connectivity was calculated
as HRF modulated pairwise correlations with seed-to-voxel
analyses with a regressor for gender. RumInd connectivity
was calculated as HRF modulated pairwise regressions with
seed-to-voxel analyses of the generalized psychophysiological
interaction (gPPI; McLaren et al., 2012) of group (HCAS and
LCAS) versus condition (RUM and ABS) interactions with a
regressor for gender. To make things clearer, η2, the effect size
for the interaction analysis, was transformed into Cohen’s d
using an online calculator (see footnote 1). The threshold for
significance was set at p ≤ 0.05 with false discovery rate cluster
correction (FDRc). Figures depicting the connectivity analyses
were made with use of MRIcroGL6.
Seed Definitions
ROIs (regions of interest) chosen for functional connectivity
seeds were based on main effects of the RUM condition from
the rumination induction task and analysis of meta-analytic
literature on the neural correlates of emotional disorders (i.e.,
depression and anxiety), these being conceptually most similar
to CAS activation. Spheres of r = 6 mm were created over the
obtained peak activations or the coordinates of peak activations
provided by other authors. The MarsBar toolbox7 was used
5https://www.nitrc.org/projects/conn
6https://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricrogl/
7http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/
to create ROIs. Talairach coordinates from meta-analyses were
converted to MNI coordinates with the mni2tal calculator8.
Nine ROIs were extracted from the RUM > ABS contrast
from the rumination induction task: left and right precunei
[−4 −58 32, −8 −52 28 and 6 −52 26], middle cingulate
cortex [0 −18 36], L-paracingulate gyrus [−6 52 8], L- and
R-superior frontal gyri [−2 56 38 and 6 52 28] and L- and
R-frontal poles [−4 62 24 and 4 56 10]. Task-based ROI labels
were based on an Harvard–Oxford anatomical atlas. Nine ROIs
were extracted from meta-analyses on depressive and anxiety
disorders: sub-callosal gyrus [2 16 −12], R-anterior cingulate
cortex [10 30 −4] (Depression; Palmer et al., 2015), L-insula
[−41 −3 −14], R-dorsal anterior cingulate cortex [−2 32 21],
R-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [30 10 50], and L-dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex [−23 25 46] (Depression; Hamilton et al.,
2012), L-insula [−42 14 −1] (Social anxiety disorder; Ipser et al.,
2013), R-anterior cingulate [5 28 18], and R-middle frontal gyrus
[41 9 40] (PTSD; Simmons and Matthews, 2012). Literature-
based ROI labels were based on nomenclature used by the
authors of meta-analyses. Due to the long-block nature of the
rumination induction task, we limited these analyses to cortical
regions chosen as ROIs.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
HCAS and LCAS groups differed strongly on all CAS measures
(CAS-1, RRS-brooding, and MCQ-30 subscales) and all the
subscales of SCL-27-plus used in this study. All differences were
large in effect size with values of d > 3.5 for CAS measures
and values of d > 1.3 for measures of psychopathology. There
were more women in the HCAS group, for this reason, a
mock variable for gender was added to the second levels of
the fMRI and functional connectivity analyses. The groups also
differed significantly with medium-to-large effect sizes on their
assessments during rumination induction, both in RUM and ABS
conditions as well as post-scan measurements of anxiety and
negative emotions – for details see Table 2.
Neuroimaging Results
Significant neural activations in the whole sample for
RUM > ABS and ABS > RUM contrasts are presented in
Figure 3 and Table 3. The RUM > ABS condition yielded
activations in bilateral precunei, bilateral superior frontal
cortices, bilateral frontal poles, and the middle cingulate cortex.
The ABS > RUM condition yielded several cortical activations:
bilateral middle temporal gyri, bilateral supramarginal gyri,
L-precentral gyrus, R-middle and inferior frontal gyri, and
bilateral frontal poles. We did not find any differences between
groups in neuronal activity in contrasts between RUM and ABS
conditions in the rumination induction task, in the flexible
factorial model, or in the two sample t-test models.
8http://sprout022.sprout.yale.edu/mni2tal/mni2tal.html
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TABLE 2 | Behavioral results of RumInd-M task and post-scan assessments.
HCAS (n = 25) LCAS (n = 33) t-Test p-Value Cohen’s d (90% CI)
Modified rumination induction RUM-sadness 4.24 (1.64) 2.09 (0.39) 6.40 < 0.001 1.80 (1.29–2.32)
RUM-anxiety 4.04 (2.07) 2.03 (0.18) 4.84 < 0.001 1.37 (0.89–1.85)
RUM-engagement 8.56 (1.76) 8.28 (2.23) 0.51 0.611
ABS-sadness 2.84 (1.03) 2.00 (0.00) 4.07 < 0.001 1.15 (0.69–1.62)
ABS-anxiety 3.12 (1.72) 2.03 (0.18) 3.16 0.004 0.89 (0.44–1.34)
ABS-engagement 8.24 (1.96) 8.84 (1.59) −1.28 0.205
STAI-state 42.32 (11.26) 29.55 (4.64) 5.34 < 0.001 1.48 (1.00–1.97)
PANAS-negative emotions 27.56 (10.51) 16.21 (1.55) 5.35 < 0.001 1.51 (1.02–2.00)
RUM, ABS, conditions in RumInd-M task; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory - State Version; PANAS, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule.
FIGURE 3 | Neural activations in the whole sample (both groups together) for
RUM > ABS and ABS > RUM contrasts. Red clusters depict activations in
the RUM > ABS contrast, blue clusters depict activations in the ABS > RUM
contrast. For details, see Table 3.
gPPI Results
Table 4 and Figure 4 displays results of gPPI of group
and condition interactions. The L-precuneus [−4 −58 32]
showed increased connectivity with parts of the L-lateral
occipital cortex and supramarginal gyrus in the HCAS group
in the RUM condition in comparison to the LCAS group
and decreased connectivity with bilateral parts of the precunei
in the RUM condition in comparison to the LCAS group;
opposite effects were observed in the ABS condition. The
L-superior frontal gyrus showed decreased connectivity with
parts of the L-superior parietal lobule and postcentral gyrus
in the HCAS group in the ABS condition in comparison
to the LCAS group and increased connectivity with the
R-precuneus in this group in the ABS condition in comparison
to LCAS group; opposite effects were seen in the RUM
condition. Also, the L-precuneus [−8 −52 28] showed
TABLE 3 | Structure activations for both groups in RUM > ABS and ABS > RUM
contrasts with FWE correction (p ≤ 0.05).
Structure name Cluster size Peak
Z-value
MNI coordinates
[x y z]
RUM > ABS contrast
L-Precuneus∗ 613 6.43 −4 −58 32
L-Precuneus∗ 613 6.30 −8 −52 28
R-Precuneus∗ 613 6.13 6 −52 26
L-Superior frontal gyrus 31 5.30 −2 56 38
2 5.02 −18 40 38
R-Frontal pole 11 5.16 4 56 10
L-Paracingulate gyrus 26 5.08 −6 52 8
L-Frontal pole 7 5.03 −4 62 25
4 4.90 −12 44 50
Middle cingulate cortex 2 4.76 0 −18 36
R-Superior frontal gyrus 1 4.83 6 52 28
ABS > RUM contrast
L-Frontal pole 315 7.18 −46 40 12
R-Middle temporal gyrus 108 6.57 60 −56 −6
L-Middle temporal gyrus∗ 372 6.49 −54 −56 −6
L-Inferior temporal gyrus∗ 372 6.33 −50 −60 −14
L-Supramarginal gyrus 326 6.47 −50 −42 50
R-Frontal pole 179 6.22 48 38 4
R-Middle frontal gyrus∗ 219 5.76 50 14 34
R-Inferior frontal gyrus∗ 219 5.73 46 10 18
L-Middle frontal gyrus 33 5.43 −50 10 32
L-Superior parietal lobule 21 5.24 −30 −54 38
R-Middle frontal gyrus 80 5.20 40 4 58
R-Supramarginal gyrus 23 5.19 44 −40 50
L-Precentral gyrus 13 5.11 −40 2 24
R, right hemisphere; L, left hemisphere; ∗one cluster containing parts
of two structures.
increased connectivity with bilateral frontal poles in the HCAS
group in the RUM condition in comparison to the LCAS group
and the opposite effect was found in the ABS condition. There
was also increased connectivity in the HCAS group in the RUM
condition between the R-precuneus and parts of the L-angular
gyrus and supramarginal gyrus in comparison to the LCAS
group; the opposite effect was observed in the ABS condition.
The R-frontal pole showed decreased connectivity in the HCAS
group in the RUM condition with four effect clusters in the right
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TABLE 4 | Group differences in gPPI rumination induction functional connectivity.
Seed [x y z] Effect [x y z] Cluster
size
Peak Z p-value
for cluster
FDRc
Cohen’s dHCAS LCAS
RUM mean β ABS mean β RUM mean β ABS mean β
L-Precuneus
[−4 −58 32]
L-Lateral occipital cortex,
supramarginal gyrus [−30 −62 38]
114 3.91 0.014 0.11 (0.33) −0.07 (0.35) −0.08 (0.25) 0.15 (0.29) 1.43
Bilateral precuneus [0 −66 22] 104 4.85 0.012 −0.11 (0.40) 0.14 (0.30) 0.08 (0.35) −0.16 (0.31) 1.44
L-Precuneus
[−8 −52 28]
L-Frontal pole [−42 58 −2 ] 168 4.46 0.001 0.24 (0.45) −0.22 (0.53) −0.29 (0.44) −0.01 (0.43) 1.49
R-Frontal pole [48 40 −6] 128 4.08 0.002 0.02 (0.29) −0.21 (0.43) −0.39 (0.41) −0.06 (0.34) 1.55
L-Superior
frontal gyrus
[−2 56 38]
L-Superior parietal lobule,
postcentral gyrus [−24 −38 56]
150 4.17 0.002 0.04 (0.25) −0.21 (0.30) −0.01 (0.28) 0.07 (0.30) 1.44
R-Precuneus [8 −70 42] 114 4.50 0.012 −0.41 (0.44) 0.17 (0.76) −0.25 (0.46) −0.29 (0.54) 1.14
R-Precuneus [6
−52 26]
L-Angular gyrus, supramarginal
gyrus [−42 −48 34]
86 4.46 0.041 0.05 (0.35) −0.15 (0.18) −0.22 (0.33) 0.03 (0.29) 1.31
R-Frontal pole
[4 56 10]
R-Lingual gyrus [14 −56 0] 112 4.03 0.01 −0.20 (0.50) −0.04 (0.32) 0.16 (0.42) −0.14 (0.34) 1.22
R-Planum temporale [58 −26 10] 111 4.07 0.01 −0.24 (0.38) −0.12 (0.37) 0.09 (0.38) 0.24 (0.38) 1.22
R-Postcentral gyrus [8 −42 62] 88 4.60 0.033 −0.26 (0.32) −0.05 (0.37) 0.07 (0.34) −0.17 (0.28) 1.28
R-Heschl’s gyrus, insular cortex
[38 −22 8]
84 5.17 0.041 −0.19 (0.26) −0.08 (0.26) 0.04 (0.22) −0.23 (0.29) 1.56
R-Anterior
cingulate cortex
[5 28 18]
Bilateral precentral, R-postcentral
gyri [4 −32 56]
96 4.34 0.022 −0.48 (0.66) −0.20 (0.54) 0.24 (0.39) −0.11 (0.43) 1.53
R-Pre–postcentral gyri [14 −32 72] 90 4.25 0.030 −0.37 (0.39) −0.18 (0.48) 0.28 (0.57) −0.16 (0.49) 1.44
L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; HCAS, high-CAS group; LCAS, low-CAS group; RUM, rumination condition in RumInd-M; ABS, abstract condition in RumInd-M.
FIGURE 4 | Seed and effect clusters for gPPI analyses. Yellow clusters depict increased connectivity in the HCAS group in the RUM condition and/or decreased
connectivity in the ABS condition in comparison to the LCAS group, cyan clusters depict decreased connectivity in the HCAS group in the RUM condition and/or
increased connectivity in the ABS condition in comparison to the LCAS group. Green clusters depict seeds with bidirectional effects. Beginnings of arrows mark the
seeds and ends mark the effects. For details of seeds, see Table 4.
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temporal and right parietal lobes (see Table 4 for details) in
comparison to the LCAS group; opposite effects were observed
in the ABS condition. A similar pattern of connectivity was
observed in the R-anterior cingulate cortex and its effect clusters –
bilateral precentral and R-postcentral gyri, and R-pre- and
postcentral gyri. All presented interaction effects are significant
with large effect sizes of Cohen’s d > 1.
Resting State Functional Connectivity
Results
The between-group differences in rsfMRI functional connectivity
are presented in Table 5 and Figure 5. The HCAS group showed
increased connectivity in comparison to the LCAS group between
the L-insula and the L-central opercular cortex and planum
temporale. Similarly, stronger connectivity in the HCAS group
was found for the seed in the R-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
leading to three resulting clusters in the R-occipital pole and
intracalcarine cortex, R-occipital pole and lingual gyrus, and
the L-intracalcarine cortex and lingual gyrus. On the other
hand, there was decreased connectivity in the HCAS group in
comparison to the LCAS group between the R-anterior cingulate
cortex and the L-frontal pole. All differences were large in effect
with all values of d > 1.
DISCUSSION
The present study used the rumination induction fMRI
task and rsfMRI method to disentangle differences in the
neural functioning of people with elevated levels of CAS in
comparison to people with low levels of CAS. We ensured
that the groups had extreme characteristics by pre-selecting
two subsamples of people with low and high results on
various measures of CAS and, additionally, by excluding
participants with non-extreme and inconclusive results on the
day of the study. A series of self-assessment questionnaires
before, during, and after the fMRI procedure was used to
address different levels of CAS, psychopathology symptoms, and
negative emotions.
Group Differences in Self-Assessment
By their construction, the studied groups differed significantly
on all used measures of CAS – the CAS-1 questionnaire,
rumination, and metacognitive beliefs concerning the need
to control thoughts as well as the perceived inability to
control thoughts and the associated dangers. Nevertheless,
both groups also differed in levels of psychopathology
symptoms – both depressive (Papageorgiou and Wells,
2003, 2009; Fergus et al., 2012, 2013) and anxiety symptoms
(Wells, 2005; Fergus et al., 2012, 2013), as well as pain
symptoms. This result is in line with numerous studies
on the relationships of psychopathology with somatic
symptoms and complaints (Bair et al., 2003; Kroenke,
2003; Tsang et al., 2008). It is noteworthy that the groups
did not differ in terms of physical illnesses and concerns
reported in SCID-I (cf. Dragan and Kowalski, unpublished).
The discrepancy between lack of difference in number of
physical illnesses and concerns in SCID-I and large difference
in self-reported levels of pain symptoms may be due to
self-focused attention and threat monitoring in people with
high levels of CAS, resulting in fixation of attention on
bodily sensations that would otherwise go unnoticed. Such
a mechanism would be consistent with an understanding
of health anxiety based on the metacognitive model
(Melli et al., 2018).
There were medium to large group differences in reported
assessments of sadness and anxiety during rumination induction,
but not in assessments of engagement. The HCAS group scored
significantly higher on levels of these negative emotions not only
when assessing their mood after the rumination condition but
also, with smaller effect size, after reading the abstract sentences.
Results from previous studies on patients with depression are
mixed: in one study there were no differences in negative
affect between MDD patients and controls during rumination
induction despite initial differences (Berman et al., 2014), and
another study (Burkhouse et al., 2017) found a significant effect
of group, as remitted MDD adolescents had higher sadness
ratings during both rumination and abstract conditions. Our
study dealt with people with time-persistent high or low levels
of CAS, so these results may indicate that CAS levels are a
prominent characteristic related to experiencing negative affect
during rumination induction. This could serve as an explanation
of remitted MDD adolescents having higher negative affect scores
at all times (Burkhouse et al., 2017) and current MDD patients
(Berman et al., 2014) having such scores only initially, before
rumination induction. This hypothesis needs to be verified by
further studies which take these results about CAS levels into
account. The large-effect group differences in levels of post-
fMRI assessments of anxiety and negative emotions are also in
line with this interpretation. Unfortunately, we did not collect
pre-rumination-induction assessments of affect, which would
enable the comparison of effects of group as well as group and
time interactions.
Effects of Negative and Abstract
Thinking
The results pertaining to main effects of conditions are partially
in line with previous results about rumination induction (Cooney
et al., 2010). The RUM > ABS direct comparison in our study
revealed neural activations in the bilateral precunei, middle
cingulate cortex, L-paracingulate gyrus, bilateral superior frontal
gyri, and bilateral frontal poles. Cooney et al. (2010) reported
a similar pattern of activations with larger parts of the frontal
cortices as well as the occipital and temporal gyri, but using a
lenient statistical threshold. This indicates engagement of the
DMN (Greicius et al., 2003) with the most prominent activation
in both precunei (Zhang and Chiang-shan, 2012). Precuneal
activity is often linked to self-referential processing (Kjaer et al.,
2002; Lou et al., 2004) and depressive rumination (Johnson
et al., 2009; Cooney et al., 2010; Milazzo et al., 2014; Burkhouse
et al., 2017). The medial parts of the prefrontal cortex are also
associated with self focused attention (Gusnard et al., 2001)
and emotional responses (Lane et al., 1997). Such a pattern
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TABLE 5 | Group differences in resting state functional connectivity.
Seed [x y z] Effect [x y z] Cluster
size
Peak Z p-Value for
cluster size FDRc
HCAS
mean Z
LCAS
mean Z
Cohen’s d (CI 90%)
HCAS > LCAS
L-Precuneus [−4 −58 32] R-Lateral occipital cortex,
fusiform gyrus [28 −86 −12]
140 4.37 0.002 0.02 (0.09) −0.09 (0.13) 0.98 (0.52 – 1.45)
L-Precuneus [−8 −52 28] R-Lateral occipital cortex
[36 −84 −4]
71 3.85 0.043 0.06 (0.11) −0.06 (0.14) 0.95 (0.49 – 1.41)
L-Insula [−41 −3 −14] L-Central opercular cortex
[−48 4 −2]
98 4.85 0.012 0.21 (0.09) 0.11 (0.06) 1.31 (0.82 – 1.79)
R-Dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex [30 10 50]
L-Intracalcarine cortex, lingual
gyrus [−8 −84 0]
100 4.31 0.010 0.05 (0.07) −0.05 (0.11) 1.09 (0.62 – 1.55)
R-Occipital pole, intracalcarine
cortex [12 −90 6]
83 4.03 0.013 0.05 (0.07) −0.04 (0.09) 1.12 (0.65 – 1.59)
R-Occipital pole, lingual gyrus
[6 −92 −6]
61 4.18 0.032 0.06 (0.09) −0.05 (0.10) 1.16 (0.69 – 1.63)
LCAS > HCAS
R-Anterior cingulate cortex
[10 30 −4]
L-Frontal pole [−32 64 6] 84 4.21 0.023 0.01 (0.07) 0.10 (0.06) −1.38 (−1.87 – −0.90)
L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; HCAS, high-CAS group; LCAS, low-CAS group.
FIGURE 5 | Seed and effect clusters of rsfMRI analyses. Yellow clusters depict increased connectivity in the HCAS group in comparison to the LCAS group. Cyan
clusters depict decreased connectivity in the HCAS group in comparison to the LCAS group. Beginnings of arrows mark the seeds and ends mark the effects. For
details, see Table 5.
of activation during negative thinking induction may reflect
cognitive components of negative thinking, specifically self-
focused attention and self-referential processing. There were no
significant brain activations in regions involved in emotional
processing in the RUM > ABS comparison, i.e., in the amygdalae,
parahippocampal gyri, or insulae.
Interestingly the ABS > RUM contrast (not reported by
Cooney et al., 2010) revealed strong activations in the bilateral
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middle temporal gyri, bilateral supramarginal gyri, L-precentral
gyrus, R-middle and inferior frontal gyri, L-precentral gyrus
and bilateral frontal poles. Widely distributed cortical activations
in parts of the frontal poles (considered functionally as
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and parts of the parietal
lobes can be identified as parts of the CEN (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002). The activity of the CEN, in opposition
to the DMN, is associated with performing cognitive tasks,
attention functioning, and working memory. The CEN as
well as middle temporal regions and supplementary motor
areas are also part of the “task-positive network” (Fox
et al., 2005), which is a net of functionally correlated
regions engaged in attention and working memory. This
may indicate that abstract sentences engaged participants
in tasks that required their attentional resources and were
cognitively demanding.
The obtained patterns of neural activity specific to negative
and abstract sentences are different and emphasize cognitive
differences between these two types of thinking. It is also
worth noting that both the DMN and CEN are engaged in
the process of mind wandering (Christoff et al., 2009). In
light of our results, this may indicate that mind wandering
is comprised of self-referential rumination and dwelling on
abstract cognitions.
Group Differences in Modified
Rumination Induction
As rumination induction has scarcely been used to-date in fMRI
studies, we based our hypotheses concerning group differences
on results obtained by Cooney et al. (2010) in a group of
depressed patients. We did not replicate these results, i.e.,
we did not uncover any significant group differences between
HCAS and LCAS groups in rumination induction in the basic
fMRI analysis. There may be several reasons for this. The first
reason may be the very design of the rumination induction
task: it is comprised of blocks of five sentences which each
last 30 s and are divided by 10 s fixation crosses, which
gives almost 200 s per block. This may subject the obtained
data to physiological noise (Liu, 2016) or noise due to the
instabilities of the magnetic field inside the scanner (Smith
et al., 1999). As such, long blocks prevent the filtering of
low-frequency changes in the fMRI signal. Thus, it would be
recommended to use shorter blocks or event-related paradigms
in future studies. The second reason may be that the sentences
used in our study did not directly tap into the individual
experiences of participants, but were more general, aiming to
evoke rumination or worry in every person, regardless of their
personal experiences. This may have resulted in weaker responses
to the stimuli used. It may be expected that personalized
ruminative sentences would evoke much higher responses in
participants (cf. Berman et al., 2014; Burkhouse et al., 2017).
Another reason may be the heterogeneity of obtained results,
as high levels of CAS can manifest in different ways, with
a person developing mood or anxiety disorders or comorbid
disorders, producing differences on the cognitive level which
could result in high variability of the fMRI signal across the
whole brain. However, it is also possible that the results of
Cooney et al. (2010) are not replicable. The authors used
a rather liberal statistical threshold. Moreover they employed
AFNI and AlphaSim software, in which a bug which elevates
levels of false positive results has been identified (Eklund et al.,
2016). Taking all the above into account, it is possible that in
the rumination induction task used, brain activity related to
repetitive negative thinking is similar in both sub-populations
and potential between-group differences are not detectable with
‘static’ general linear model analysis. Thus we decided to seek
possible between-group differences, delving into more dynamic
temporal characteristics of brain activity, i.e., applying functional
connectivity analyses.
Generalized Psychophysiological
Interactions
The results of this study provide the first evidence that high
levels of CAS are related to disrupted patterns of functional
neural connectivity. Moreover, the between-group differences
were found not only during rumination and worry, but
also in abstract thinking. We conducted a gPPI functional
connectivity analysis using areas found to be active in the
RUM condition as seeds as well as ROIs based on meta-
analytical literature on mood and anxiety disorders. The results
show disrupted functional connectivity in the HCAS group
within the DMN – the precunei, the medial parts of the
prefrontal cortices, and parts of the occipital cortex (Greicius
et al., 2003; Zhang and Chiang-shan, 2012) – during evoked
negative thoughts. This may indicate a heightened tendency
toward self-referential thinking and focusing attention on the
self (Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 2008). A similar
pattern of functional connectivity was also found in depression
and interpreted as an inability of MDD patients to down-
regulate cognitive activity broadly associated with the DMN
(Sheline et al., 2009).
There was also an interaction indicating a pattern of
heightened connectivity in the RUM condition and/or lowered
connectivity in the ABS condition in the HCAS group in
comparison to the LCAS group between the L-precuneus
and bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortices (vlPFC), which
play a role in emotion processing in MDD (Keedwell et al.,
2005). Furthermore the vlPFC are associated with anxiety (in
primates; Agustín-Pavón et al., 2012) and, more specifically,
attention bias to both threatening and neutral stimuli in
anxiety and anxiety related disorders (Sylvester et al., 2012)
and PTSD (Fani et al., 2012). Previous research on adolescents
(Guyer et al., 2008; Monk et al., 2008) has shown that
functioning of the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex may be
modulated by the amygdala in social phobia and GAD.
Current results suggest that the functioning of the vlPFC is
modulated by disrupted functioning of the DMN, particularly
the precuneus, which may “override” the regulatory role of the
vlPFC in emotional processing and indicates the proneness of
HCAS subjects to attention bias in self-referential processing
(Wells, 2009).
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We also observed a disrupted connectivity pattern in parts
of the DMN during the abstract condition in the HCAS group.
Interaction indicating increased connectivity was found between
medial parts of the frontal cortex and R-precuneus, as well as
within frontal and parietal parts of the DMN, and also within
the precunei. Diminished connectivity of the anterior part of
the cingulate cortex, interpreted as part of the salience network
(Peters et al., 2016), with medial parts of the somatosensory
cortex was found in the HCAS group in both RUM and ABS
conditions, as compared to the LCAS group. A similar pattern
of connectivity was also found between part of the DMN –
the medial part of the prefrontal cortex (mPFC) – and the
medial part of the somatosensory cortex. The rostral part of
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which plays a role in the
symptomatology of various emotional disorders (Etkin et al.,
2006), was shown to modulate the activity of the amygdala
in task (Etkin et al., 2006) and resting state (Margulies et al.,
2007) fMRI. Diminished connectivity between the ACC, mPFC,
and somatosensory cortex in the HCAS group may indicate
the mechanism of disrupted regulation of perception of bodily
sensations. This result may be in line with the higher scores
on the pain and vegetative symptoms subscale of the SCL-27-
plus in the HCAS group. Perhaps the disrupted connectivity of
the ACC, mPFC, and somatosensory cortex is related to one
of the core mechanisms of CAS – heightened vigilance and
monitoring for threatening stimuli, including threatening bodily
sensations, which is characteristic of anxiety and anxiety-related
disorders (Wells and Carter, 2001; Esteve and Camacho, 2008;
Ginzburg et al., 2014).
There was also an interaction indicating a decreased
connectivity pattern in the RUM condition and/or increased
connectivity pattern in the ABS condition in the HCAS group in
comparison to the LCAS group between part of the mPFC, part
of the DMN, and R-Heschl’s gyrus, insular cortex, and R-planum
temporale, which have been shown to be engaged in auditory
(Storti et al., 2013) and language (Nakada et al., 2001; Buchsbaum
et al., 2005) processing. These results are also consistent with
diminished resting state connectivity in Heschl’s gyrus and the
planum temporale in high trait-anxiety participants (Modi et al.,
2015). Taking into account that Heschl’s gyrus is engaged in
both task-elicited and spontaneous inner speech (Hurlburt et al.,
2016), it may be hypothesized that the disrupted connectivity of
the DMN, mPFC in this case, and parts of auditory and language
circuitries reflects the tendency for repetitive negative thinking
typical of HCAS participants (Wells, 2009).
These results may not only serve as evidence for difficulty
in down-regulating DMN activity in HCAS subjects during
ruminative and abstract thinking, but also suggest a more
global pattern of functional connectivity during various types
of thinking and diminished cognitive control (Peters et al.,
2016). This conclusion is supported by higher amplitudes of
changes in connectivity between conditions in the HCAS group
in comparison to the control group (see beta values in Table 3).
Different patterns of connectivity in the more cognitively
demanding ABS condition between groups also suggests that
high levels of CAS may be associated with disturbances in
the performance of cognitive tasks observed in clinical groups
(Austin et al., 2001; Bishop et al., 2004; Eysenck et al., 2007;
Hammar and Årdal, 2009; Murrough et al., 2011), which is
in line with the S-REF model and the metacognitive theory
of psychological disorders (Wells and Matthews, 1994; Wells,
2009).
The described results are also in line with those showing
connectivity disruptions in rsfMRI and task-based fMRI in MDD
patients (Zhang et al., 2011; Sambataro et al., 2014; Palmer et al.,
2015) and anxiety disorder patients (Ding et al., 2011; Lei et al.,
2015). This suggests that clinical levels of psychopathology and
clinical diagnoses may not be necessary to observe disrupted
patterns of functional connectivity in the brain. High levels of
CAS may serve as an underlying factor not only for the symptoms
observed in various clinical afflictions, but also can be associated
with corresponding patterns of neural functioning.
Resting State Functional Connectivity
In the current study, we also examined functional connectivity
from brain activity recorded during a 10-min-long resting state
fMRI procedure. We found the HCAS group to be characterized
by stronger connectivity between several brain regions as
compared to the LCAS group. First, the HCAS group showed
stronger functional connectivity between the posterior part of
the insula, a region involved, inter alia, in emotional processing
during memory retrieval (Phan et al., 2002) and part of the
opercular cortex in the left hemisphere, which is associated with
auditory imagery (Lima et al., 2015). This pattern of connectivity
could reflect the process of repetitive negative thinking occurring
in the HCAS group – with interplay between parts of brain
associated with emotion processing during memory retrieval
(Phan et al., 2002) and verbal imagery. Increased connectivity was
also found between the R-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is
associated with working memory and a part of the CEN (Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002), and medial parts of the occipital lobe cortex
associated with word recognition and processing (Mechelli et al.,
2000) and visual processing (Kozlovskiy et al., 2014). Perhaps
this increased connectivity may reflect common activations of
these structures on a daily basis during the frequent rumination,
worry, and reflection of the participants in the HCAS group.
This is consistent with the results of the questionnaires they
filled-in immediately before the fMRI study. It is noteworthy
that diminished, not increased, connectivity was found between
frontal and occipital brain regions in patients with social anxiety
disorder (Ding et al., 2011). This result was interpreted by
the authors as disrupted processing of visual stimuli in social
contexts. Similarly, our results may suggest that CAS is an
underlying factor of the heightened salience of threatening social
cues in social anxiety disorder. This calls for investigation in
further studies, as the results of this and other studies are mixed.
There was also a pattern of decreased connectivity found
in the HCAS group as compared to the control group. This
pattern was observed between part of the ACC and part of the
ventral frontal pole which, again, are parts of the salience and
CENs, respectively. Disruption in this connection was found
in patients with GAD and interpreted as a dysfunction of top-
down control over emotion regulation (Mochcovitch et al., 2014).
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In general, the obtained results can be understood as altered
interplay between different brain networks in people with high
levels of CAS. Similar abnormalities were reported in studies on
different clinical disorders such as depression (Zhang et al., 2011;
Mulders et al., 2015; Peters et al., 2016) and social anxiety (Ding
et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2015). This points to CAS as a probable
factor underlying the clinical symptomatology and disrupted
neural functional connectivity in people with different clinical
afflictions, or even in people without a current diagnosis but with
a high risk of developing emotional disorders.
CONCLUSION
To our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the neural
correlates of CAS. In this study we showed that treatment-
and diagnosis-naive people with high levels of CAS differ
substantially from people with low levels of this syndrome on
various psychopathology and affect measures. Nearly half of the
HCAS group was diagnosed with at least one current psychiatric
disorder, predominantly mood and anxiety disorders as well as
PTSD. We also demonstrated a large difference in self-assessment
in these groups during repeated induction of negative thinking.
These serve as proof-of-concept results of the metacognitive
theory of emotional disorders (Wells, 2009). Contrary to our
first hypothesis, we had no success in replicating rumination
induction results in depressed participants (Cooney et al.,
2010), for which there may be methodological and theoretical
reasons. Irrespective of previous results, we demonstrated that
neuronal activity during negative thinking is strongly related to
neural activation of the DMN and that brain activity patterns
during abstract thinking resemble the CEN. We were able
to demonstrate evidence for our two hypotheses regarding
differences in functional connectivity between groups. We
showed, that low- and high-CAS groups differed in measures of
functional connectivity during rumination and worry as well as
during abstract thinking and resting state fMRI: high levels of
CAS were related to disrupted patterns of connectivity within
and between various brain networks – the DMN, the salience
network, and the CEN. Overall, our results suggest that people
with high levels of CAS tend to have disrupted neural processing
in the areas of self-referential, task-oriented, and emotional
processing. The obtained results are broadly analogous to results
obtained in fMRI studies of different clinical groups with mood,
anxiety, and PTSDs, which serves as an argument for recognizing
high levels of CAS as an underlying factor of emotional disorders
and their neural correlates. These results are consistent with
the theoretical underpinnings of the metacognitive theory of
psychopathology, suggesting a common mechanism of emotional
disorders originating in CAS and laying the foundations for
further exploration of neural correlates of CAS. Future studies
should use different, better-established fMRI paradigms and
more differentiated groups, such as people with high levels of
CAS with and without clinical diagnoses.
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